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This report summarizes the work performed on grant number BNS — 8016275 
from May 1, 1981 until April 30, 1982. The main body of the report simply 
reviews the activities of the investigators and briefly reports results and 
proposed future actions. A more detailed compilation of the results of our 
work to date may be found in the working papers provided as Appendices A a -.d 
B. 
Scope of the Work  
The focus of this research is the behavioral analysis of finan:i-E7 
allocations to projects when those projects have a sunk cost. The 
of interest because case studies and casual reports of managers and 
consultants indicate that allocators, in practice, may not follow the 
financially rational strategy of ignoring sunk costs. Previous laborat?ry 
studies of escalation and commitment in resource allocation de:isio S ( C 
Staw, 1981) suggest that sunk costs alone and in conjunction with various  
social—psychological phenomena may produce committment to a project that 
cause an allocation to extend more support than he/she should. 
research proposed to examine such phenomena in more ecologically valicl way 
ancl was proposed in three phases. Phase one has been completed and the 
investigators are presently working on phase two and preparing for phase 
three. 
Phase One  
This phase, as proposed, was to conduct interviews with small groups of 
managers in which they would describe, both generically and specifically, 
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situations in which allocations were made to projects for which there was a 
history of sunk costs. The objectives were (1) to gather information that 
would be valuable for constructing case scenarious which could be presented 
to managerial samples in order to better investigate the impact of variou 
factors on responses to sunk costs and (2) to identify what SOME of those 
factors might he. 
At this point, phase one is essentially complete. During this pl-laF, r 
the investigators conducted focus group interviews with managers fro7. a 
convenience sample of nine corporations. This sample included four 
corporations devoted essentially to the manufacturing, marketing and 
delivery of hard goods, four corporations devoted to the marketing an 
delivering of essential non-financial services and one finanzial servl 
organization. All of these were private sector firms. With the ex:eptio7, 
of the financial corporation and one of the manufacturing firms, inter - ie 
were held with small groups of top level managers who were deemed by o_.7 -
various contacts in these organizations to be or have been centrally, 
involved in financial allocation decisions. In the financial corporati, 
two focus groups interviews were held, one with corporate controllers and 
the other with credit managers. In one manufacturing firm, one-on-on ,J 
interviews were held with three senior executives regarding a particula-
product which was removed from the market partly because of sunk costs. In 
all cases, interviews were conducted at corporate headquarters with groups 
where at least one member was a senior level (i.e., Vice-Presidential or 
above) executive. Group sizes varied from two to six. 
The format used for the interviews was extremely non-directive. There 
were basically three phases to each interview. The first phase was devoted 
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to having the managers define "sunk costs" and talk about how they are 
perceived and treated. The second phase asked managers to recall cases of 
decisions that involved sunk costs. The interviewers in this stage 
attempted to get the managers to describe what created the sunk cost, 
estimate its magnitude and implications, to describe the various action 
alternatives available and/or taken in response to the sunk cost and 
the results of those actions. The last phase asked the interviewers to 
summarize those factors which may have caused an allocator to consider 
costs when making allocations. 
The results of these interviews will be presented in two ways. First, 
we shall present a tabulation, and second, a set of general observations 
about the nature of the sunk cost cases. 
A total of 16 cases were identified. The investigators, for purclsc 
of this tabulation, did not attempt to evaluate whether each case was a bons  
fide instance of decision making with sunk costs, but left that 
the interviewers who presented the case. These cases are tabulated in 77a 
1 and are subdivided by allocations into four basic types: Mergers an:=_ 
1cquisitions, New Products, New Plant, Equipment and Processes an' , final.„ 
Normal Operations. 
Mergers and Acquisitions are attempts by a firm to secure a new 
operating company. They are acquisitions of ongoing businesses which may or 
may not be similar to the acquiring firm's ongoing business. New Products 
are allocations made to cover the costs of bringing new products or services 
market and more specifically, may cover development costs, costs of 
establishing new technology for production and the costs of establishing ne ,,, 
 markets. New Plant, Equipment or Processes are allocations to acquire new 
capital or establishing new processes in order to continue or become more 
effective in the ongoing business. Normal Operations are expenditures made 
to cover every—day costs. 
The cases are described according to the type of business in Which the 
case originated, a brief description of the allocation, a brief descriee on 
of the setback and why it occurred and the current disposition of the 
product or project for which the allocation was made. These are larFe 
self explanatory. 
Content of the Cases. A review of the content of the le., cases reve21.,, d 
a number of things about sunk costs. First, it was clear that nearly all of 
the managers interviewed preferred to view all allocations as, in SC= Wa': 
recoverable and that allocations became "sunk" when they were ne lo-:
recoverable. The most common circumstance leading to nonrecoyerability wL, 
start—up costs, particularly for projects or programs about which the fir—, 
was relatively unfamiliar. It also appeared that sunk costs general 
involved an underestimation of costs or the time that would pass befor, 
returns would accrue. Secondly, the perception of managers that a cost wa-
"sunk" depended greatly on their initial expectations regardinc the lipel 
efficiency of resource expenditures. A non—recoverable expenditure tha we 
anticipated a priori was not generally classified as a "sun cost" be t_E 
managers. Thirdly, the cases revealed that the impact of sunk costs on 
subsequent decision making depended on the exact nature of the 
interdependency that linked decisions together into what Staw has called; a 
course of actions. Our cases indicated at least six types of 
interdependency: financial, environment and market, technological, 
strategic resource utilization, corporate strategy and personal. The impact 
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of a sunk cost early—on in a sequence of actions seems to depend on the 
nature of the interdependency. 
Other Phase I Activities. In addition to conducting and analyzing thr 
focus group interviews, the investigators also intensely examined 
financial decision making literature concerning sunk costs. T .1-1 
literature, which is primarily devoted to modeling allocation decis: 
according to a normative criterion of economic rationality, is quit e 
about its treatment of sunk costs. Specifically, at the point of a de- 4 
the presence or absence of past allocations to a project are not, of 
themselves, relevant to the present decision. This does not deny that  
assets created by previous allocations can impact the expectations 
future cash flows, but suggests that the effect of the previous a11 ,-, a 
operates only throeck future cash flows. 
The applicability of the normative models to the previous reseer 
"The A & S Financial Decision Case" (Staw, 1975; Staw and I- ox, 
Staw, 1979) and "The World Bank Study" (Staw and Ross, 197) was 
It was found that because of limitations in the information provide! 
these scenarios, decision makers would be unable to adhere t2, rational 
models without making assumptions about costs, times, assets values and ca: 
flows. 	It is also possible that the results of the previous studies 
have been affected by the impact of the various experimental manipulation 
on such assumptions. The present investigators feel that the scenarios use= 
in the prior studies should be restructured to provide sufficient 
information for using the normative model and some of the experimental 
manipulations should be replicated. 
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One result of investigating the normative financial models was the 
realization that for many, perhaps most, allocation situations the nature of 
cost and revenue functions make withdrawal from an ongoing project 
financially unwise. More specifically, projects where start up costs are 
high relative to later costs or where significant costs accrue before 
revenues are generated it is highly unlikely that withdrawal could eve:: 
financially rational prior to significant depreciation of assets (see 
appendix B). 
The Yield of Phase I. Phase I has contributed greatly to the 
investigators' understanding of what sunk costs are, how they are perceived 
by managers, the kinds of allocations in which they occur, the aTpropriat 
normative treatment of those costs and the classes of interdependen:1 
which may cause decision makers to deviate from the rational track. 
importantly, the results of the focus group interviews further illuminat• 
the meaning of a course of action as it applies to sequential decisio7. 
making. 	Staw (1981), we feel, is not particularly clear about what 
distinguishes a course of action from any set of temporally related 
decisions. 	For example, Staw provides, as illustrations of course 
actions, the Chicago Sewer Authority's "Deep Tunnel" project as well as 
case of an investor who must decide whether or not to purchase additional 
stock in a company in which he already owns shares of stock purchase:: at a 
price significantly above its current market value (i.e. he has suffered 
losses). In the Deep Tunnel example, allocation decisions are linked in 
several ways. First, there is a financial interdependency in which prior 
expenditures create assets which may increase or make possible the return 
that will accrue from additional allocations, there is a strategy 
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interdependency in which each allocation holds a unique place in a sequence 
leading to overall goal attainment, there is a resource utilization 
interdependency in which unique resources which may benefit the city in a 
number of ways are acquired and there is an environment interdependency in 
terms of a commitment to the community involving the delivery of services, 
the elimination of drainage problems and the employment of residents. 
The stock purchase case provides a marked contrast. 	In this case, there are 
no interdependencies among the decisions except for those which might 
cognitively imposed by the investor. The decisions are financi 
independent because the expected yield of a share purchased now is unrelate:: 
to whether or not the investor already owns shares. Unlike the Deep Tense 
case, there are no environmental, strategic resource or obviDus strategy 
interdependencies. Yet it is possible that the decision maker may, beca::s 
of how the perceives and categorizes stock purchases, view these as 
decisions as interdependent. One instance of this might be his thinf- ,.ir7- 
about the stocks from a single company as a portfolio so that instea ,!, of 
evaluating each purchase strictly on its own merit, it is evaluate -1 in ter7 , 
 of its impact on the performance of the entire portfolio. This, of cc-„ 
would not be financially rational according to present value criteria. 
These examples, when discussed according to the interdependencies they 
imply within sequences of decisions, illustrate that courses of action are a 
series of actions (i.e. decisions) which are linked together by one or more 
interdependencies. It is probable that the degree to which a decision maker 
believes a course of action exists and the extent that decisions influence 
one—another depends on the nature and number of interdependencies present in 
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the sequence. His commitment to the sequence may also vary according to 
those interdependencies. 
Phase Two. This phase, as proposed, involved the construction a-d 
classification of sunk cost cases that could be used to study allocations 
with managers as subjects. The research has now entered this phase an 
approaching the problem of case construction in a serial manner. The 
results of phase one suggested that several reasonably basic issues should 
be resolved prior to investigating factors which impact surfK cost behavior . 
It is not clear from the previous literature whether allocators were 
behaving rationally or irrationally. Our first step will be to construct 
case stimuli and experiments that permit the solution of allocation problem s 
according to basic financial principles. If allocators can be shown to 
behave according to these principles, then these stimuli can be embellish..; 
to examine a variety of additional issues. 	If allocators do not adhere to 
economically rational strategies, then a logical research tactic would he to 
examine why using in—depth process—tracing techniques. 
Expected Yield of Phase Two. This phase is expected to result in a set 
of cases for which a economically rational allocation can be determine: and, 
therefore, deviations from those allocations can be studied. T-ollowin 
phase one (and the original proposal) we hypothesize that adherence to 
economic rationality will depend on a variety of factors including, but not 
limited to, ego involvement and external visibility. Among these would be 
factors related to the interdependencies implied by a sequence of actions 
including the retention of critical resources, adherence to an overall 
corporate strategy, commitments to external constituencies and cognitive 
phenomena such as "portfolio thinking". 
9 
Phase Three. This phase, as proposed, involved the application of 1,71c 
cases developed in phase two to samples of working managers. This phas e , 
which will commence in Fall, 1982, has not changed in intention except that 
managerial samples are now available through the Universities of Arizona a ❑H. 
Iowa. 
Overall Yield of The Research. We feel that phase one, alone, h e 
significantly contributed to our understanding of sunk costs an:'. ther 
relevance to courses of actions. There are many ways in which the 
of prior decisions, success or failures, in interaction with the natre 
an action sequence and the task environment might impact subsequent 
de:isions. 	Financial rationality, as it is described in econom: th,rv, 
cannot totally explain the behavior of managers in real-world allocatio-. 
settings. The results of phase one suggest that the relevance of econ7- 
criteria to a decision may systematically vary depending not only or 
ability of allocators to evaluate and calculate, but on the circumstan:= 
surrounding, an action sequence. Some of these circumstances may create 
social-psychological commitment as it has been framed by Staw, 
phenomena may also be operating. This research has already yielded 
how some of the previously studied commitment phenomena are exhibited in 
real organizational contexts. We expect that these are additions' phe=n,=!n 
will be indicated and better understood through the remainder of this 
project. 
TABLE 1  
A Tabulation of the Sunk Cost Cases 
urgers and Acquisitions  






Brief Description  
Overseas acquisition 
Firm buys former over-
seas licensee 
Bought a small firm 




Bought a small 
bank. 










start up costs 
overpaid. 
Current Disposition  
Still holding 
Paid 30&,030 to dive 
Still holding. Ecnk 
is still profitarie 
when ignore start 
costs. 
Products 






Brief Description  
Entered new emerging 
market with new 
products. 
Designed new product 
for a certain large 
customer's use. 
Designed, assembled 
and marketed a new 
product that would 
serve a new market 
for the firm. 
Cause of Setback  
*Entered market 5 
years too early 
carrying costs 
not recouped. 













costs due to 
marketing expenses 
with no established 
product. 









*No longer marketir: 
or producing 
product looks. - : to 
sell the concert. 
TABLE 1 
(Continued) 
ew Plant Equipment or Processes 











Brief Description  
Plants devoted to 
certain unprofitable 




prior to full 
Firm opened branch 
office expecting to 
lose 5 million over 
Old engine parts 
obsoleted by more 
efficient new 
Purchse 900,000 
dollar piece of 
equipment to make 
engine repairs 
rather than make 
costly assembly 
replacement. 
Cause of Setback 
*Weak markets 
*Rapid change in 
technology 
*Competitive 
market with high 
start up costs. 
change spurred on 
by fuel costs 
*High start up and 
carrying costs 
because of time 
lege due to (1) 
perfecting 
Processing and (2) 
satisfying 
regulatory bodies. 
Current Disposition  
*Closed one plant, 
reallocated others 
to differedt divisions 
*Write off old 
machines and 
new ones immediately. 
*Now in 3rd Year, 
losing as expeete=',. 
assembles w,i le 
trying to depletc 
existing 	art ,, 
 inventory. 
*Nearly gave ,,17 
sold maehin,. 
Process was sE..veJ. 
by 11th 11 -1- .:r 
approval. 





*Technology 	 *Immedia:, write- 
Manufacturing 	occasionally replaced 
	
change. 	 off and 1-y:r: 1- = 
Light Firm purchased a *Large 	carrying *Fire-1 	vendJr, 	to 
man -_Ifacturing computer 	to eliminate costs 	due 	to 	slow on the dev7 
an 	large, 	labor 
intensive 	sequence 	of 
tasks. 	Were 	dis- 
development, 




satisfied with progress 
and price of 
implementation. 








felt unfamiliar with 
the type of project. 
*Did not anticipate *Discontinued 
adverse public 	campaign. 




may never recou7 
development 
cost. 
*Accept that risk 
and take lose 
such ite7=. 
(Continued) 
Brief Description  
Firm spent $25,000 
preparing an invited 
bid on a very large 
project, then 
declined to bid. 
Firm spent a large 
amount on an 
advertising campaign 
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Appendix A 
Conducting Ecologically and Internally 
Valid Decision Making Studies: A Case 
of Sunk Cost and Commitment Exp e riments 
Edward J. Conlon 
Georgia Institute of Techologv 
Gerrit Wolf 
University of Arizona 
Marva Leatherwood 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
CONDUCTING ECOLOGICALLY AND INTERNALLY VALID 
DECISION MAKING STUDIES: A CASE OF SUNK 
COST AND COMMITMENT EXPERIMENTS 
Few areas in the social and behavioral sciences have experienced the amount 
of growth and acceptance evident in the area of behavioral decision theory 
in the last 15 years (see Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981 for a review). In spite 
of this, however, relatively few attempts (e.g. Hogarth, 1980) have been ma,-_'e 
to extend such research and theory to particular task contexts such as pro-
totypic types of managerial decisions. More specifically, the empirical re- 
search designs in behavioral decision theory have been predominately laboratory 
based and theory driven with less concern for ecological validity or the 
nature of situations to which many decisions actually occur. A major lesson 
from research on human problem solving is that the task environment, which is 
loosely defined as all those factors external to the individual which impact 
the information processing involved in task performance, is critical to 
understanding the quality of outcomes (Newell and Simon 1972). 
One exception to this trend are the recent studies on escalating commitment 
in allocation decisions which result from sunk costs (i.e. failure experiences) 
(e.g. Staw, 1976; Staw and Fox, 1977; Staw and Ross, 1978, Conlon and Wolf, 195 -J). 
Although these studies are also predominately theory driven, they attend 
to important considerations which commonly appear in organizational contexts. 
Among these are the interdependency of present decisions with those of the 
past, the contribution of social and policy concerns to decision maker preferences 
and the role of setbacks and feedback in sequential decisions. Although this 
area of research has generated some interesting results and theory, it has two 
important shortcomings. Firstly, unlike mainstream behavioral decision research, 
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it ignores the normative models that have been developed for making allocation 
decisions that are now part of formal training in management. Secondly, in 
spite of its contextual theme, it remains rather naive of context. In this 
paper we use an examination of normative, financial decision models, the re-
sults of focus group interviews with managers to collect cases of decisions 
with sunk costs and an examination of prior research on commitment and 
escalation to assess the ecological and internal validity of the prior research. 
We also provide suggestions and an agenda for future studies. 
The Prototypic Sunk Cost Situation  
In the eyes of managers, sunk costs are resources, previously committed, 
which are no longer recoverable regardless of any action taken by an alloea:or. 
Sunk costs are a staple in most introductory accounting texts because, as 
will be discussed below, they are to be ignored in any economically based 
decision model. 
The prototypical situation concerns at least two allocations, one at 
time one and one at time two, where the time two decision is of central 
interest. The time one decision together with subsequent events create the 
sunk cost. For example, suppose that an allocator has committed 50 million 
dollars to build a hydroelectric dam in Nigeria. It has been estimated that 
this allocation would complete the dam. After two years, the 50 million is 
spent and the dam is only 4/5 completed because certain corrupt local 
officials have skimmed 10 million dollars. Construction experts estimate that 
the dam may be completed at a cost of 10 million more. At time two, the 
allocator must decide whether or not to allocate an additional amount to the 
dam project. 
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The exact magnitude of the prior allocation forgone depends on the allocator's 
choice of alternatives. If the allocator decides to finish the dam, there 
will always be an economic sunk cost which will be exhibited as a decreased 
return on investment over the useful life of the dam. At minimum, this 
would be the cash value of the ten million over the life of the dam. Suppose 
however, that a local mining company was willing to buy the 4/5 completed 
dam at some price? Depending on the price and the original allocator's 
opportunity costs for that 50 million over the two years of construction, the 
sunk costs could vary from $0 to $50 million plus opportunity costs minus the 
price paid. In most cases, unless the prospective buyer has an internal rate 
of return on the asset greatly in excess of the seller's rate or places a 
high value on the seller's learning (i.e. is willing to absorb the 10 milli= 
as the cost of information about corruption), he would hot be willing to compensate 
the seller for the loss and there would be a sunk cost. The normative model 
suggests that the allocator should choose the alternative that minimizes 
the cost. 
An auditor's analysis of the situation would carefully assess the 
opportunity and transaction cost in determining any losses associated with 
the allocator's actions. In a sense, this is the closest one may get to 
a purely objective or economic assessment of the sunk costs. From a behavioral 
perspective, however, an allocator may or may not agree with an auditor's view. 
It is particularly important how the allocator frames the loss for understanding 
his/her future behavior. For example, the allocator may frame the 10 million 
as the cost of finding out about corruption (i.e. learning) where such 
learning is viewed as an asset. In another scenario, suppose the expected 
return on the dam was well above that of all other alternative investments and, 
even with the 10 million loss, compares favorably with those alternatives. 
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The allocator, again,may not regard the event as a loss. A behavioral 
analysis must be concerned with two issues. When from an objective (i.e. auditing ) 
perspective a prior allocation is sunk (i.e. not recoverable), (1) what factors 
affect an allocator's perceptions and sentiments about that loss and (2) how 
do those perceptions and sentiments affect future allocations? 
Behavioral Models of Allocation Decisions  
The most complete behavioral analysis of sunk cost allocations is providecl 
by Stew (1981). A key distinction in his analysis concerns the allocators 
primary motivations at time two which can be classified into three types. 
The prospectively focused allocator allocates according to the normative 
model; that is, he/she assesses the likelihood of all outcomes that might 
accrue from each decision alternative, the utilities associated with those 
alternatives and chooses the one that maximizes utility (i.e. the SET: model). 
This view is consistent with the normative model as long as the perceptions 
of the allocator about the likelihood and validity of outcomes are in agree-
ment with the objective criteria (i.e. the auditor's view). Staw suggests, 
however, that an allocator's perceptions of the likelihood and utilities 
could be biased by sunk costs, making it hard to separate the perspective 
focus from other foci. When biases don't occur, however, the impact of the 
sunk cost on future decisions is simply through learning; that is, the 
allocator's expectations are altered based on past events. 
A retrospectively focused allocator "seeks to appear competent in previc , 
 as opposed to future actions" (Staw, 1981 p. 583). In the sunk cost context, 
the allocator's time two actions are designed to justify the sunk cost in 
some way (by definition, the cost cannot be eliminated). Recent research on 
escalating commitment in response to failure (e.g. Stew, 1976; Stew and Fox, 
1977; Staw and Ross, 1978) has examined the escalation of future allocations 
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as one possible outcome of the need to justify past actions. Staw (1981, p. 581) 
states that ". . .motivation to justify decisions can be seen as a function 
of responsibility for negative consequences (i.e. sunk costs) as well as 
both internal and external demands for competence." The internal justification 
esteem in situations of failure by behaving consistently, even when negative 
consequences result. The external justification process is a product of the 
need to appear competent in the eyes of others. By escalating, one may 
demonstrate to others one's beliefs in the correctness of the earlier decision 
in spite of the setback. 
The last motivation affecting allocations is a norm supporting consistency. 
Staw has argued that managers, either implicitly or explicitly, are subject 
to norms supporting consistent action; that is, they believe that consisten 
in action is an appropriate form of managerial behavior. For that reason 
they may tend to continue to allocate in a way that is consistent with past 
action. 
In summary, Staw's model relies heavily on cognitive consistency and 
social influence factors which are related to individual competency motivation 
in order to explain the persistence of allocators in the face of failures. 
Financial Models of Allocations 
From a financial perspective, resources are always allocated with the 
expectation of a return. All normative models of financial allocations contain 
at least two common components: (1) a valuation of the return and (2) a 
likelihood estimate on the return. This is, of course, the essence of the 
expected value (E.V.) model. Even acknowledging that financial models may 
be far more complex than the basic E.V. model, it is true that all of them 
share its essentials. 
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As we have already suggested, sunk costs are created when allocations 
fail to obtain the expected or required return and nothing can be done about 
it. Because there is no remedy for sunk costs, financial models of allocations 
rightly exclude such costs from consideration because they can have no 
impact on future returns except that an allocator may, because of the loss, 
revise his estimates of the values and likelihood of the outcomes associates 
with the previously chosen alternative. 
Tax implications and the volatility of the economic value of outcomes 
lead. to some important distinctions among types of resource allocations. 
Most critical to the creation of sunk costs is the distinction between allocations 
that create assets and those which are treated as expenses. 
Asset Creating Allocations-- Many economic allocations are made in order to 
acquire tangible items whose economic value is known or estimable with 
reasonable certainty. Examples are the purschasing of plant and equipment 
or the acquisition of patent rights and exclusive licenses. Generally accepted 
accounting principles are unambiguous about how such assets are to be valued 
and depreciated. Another class of assets, however, are called intangibles. 
Intangibles occur most frequently in the acquisition of enterprises whose 
price exceeds the value of their tangible assets. In such cases, the 
difference between the price paid and the value of tangible assets is 
allocated to an accounting category called "goodwill". Presumably, this 
excess payment is justified by the anticipation of a premium return which 
could result from certain advantages such as brand loyalty, market share, 
unique technologies and locations. 
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The distiction between tangibles and intangibles is important for two 
reasons: volatility and depreciation. The value of tangible assets should 
be less volatile than intangibles because the price paid for a tangible asset 
should reflect some ascetainable market value. (In the absence of unexpected 
obsolesence or other economic catastrophes, the price paid for a tangible 
asset should always be at least partially recoverable through use, tax de7._eciL:i 
and/or sale. Generally speaking, standard assets such as real estate, generic 
equipment, warehouse space and so forth are relatively immune to becoming 
sunk costs. Product specific assets such as special tooling, patents and licenses 
are somewhat more exposed to risk because their value rests specifically on th.- 
fate of a single product. Either type of tangible asset is more certain both in 
internal value and value over time than are intangible assets. By definition, 
goodwill is determined by whatever a firm will pay for an acquisition in E.7.,EEs 
of its real asset value. In a competitive environment with many buyers anc 
sellers, price should accurately reflect real value, hence goodwill should 
be recoverable by resale. To the extent that acquisitions are not always 
made on a price competitive basis, the goodwill paid may reflect a particulnr 
idiosyncracy rather than a market value, hence the "right price" is less 
certifiable for goodwill than for tangible assets. Secondly, the value of 
goodwill over time need not behave in a regular fashion as would wear and tear 
on a tangible asset. It may increase or decrease very quickly. For examTie, 
the goodwill associated with the Chevrolet Corvair evaporated quickly with 
the publication of Ralph Nader's Unsafe at any Speed just as the market value 
of recordings of Ravel's Bolero increased with the release of the movie "10". 
The tax advantage of depreciation also distinguishes tangibles from 
intangibles. By tax law, all tangible assets have a useful life over which 
most of their value (i.e. price) may be depreciated for tax purposes. Hence 
excluding catastrophe, at least a portion of the value is always recoverable 
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(i.e. any sunk cost resulting from a tangible will be less than its price). 
Depreciation on intangibles is not tax deductible and must be charged direct' -
against revenue over a specified period of time. For example, goodwill must 
be amortized over a maximum of 40 years. 
In summary, allocations that create assets may create sunk costs in 
two circumstances. First, the value of the asset may suddenly change in terms 
of its resale value and return on investment. For tangible assets such a 
change would probably signify a catastrophe such as the unexpected obsolescence 
of the item being produced by the asset. In the case of intangibles, it 
could signify mismanagement or changes in consumer preferences. Second , a 
firm may have overpaid for the asset to begin with (i.e.the price was not 
justified by the returns). This is not likely for tangible assets whose vale 
is certifiable in the market, but can occur for idiosyncratic tangible or 
intangible assets. In the case of all assets, sunk costs may generally be spread 
out over time and, hence, need not be reflected in the performance of a fir: 
for a single period. 
Expensed Allocations--Certain allocations are not regarded as creating assets 
and must be expensed (i.e. charge against revenues) in the reporting period 
over in which they occur. Prime examples are R & D expenditures and training 
costs. By their nature, the expected return on these expenditures is far 
less certain and therefore riskier than for assets which, at the very least, 
typically retain a salvage value. In the case of training, for example, a 
manager on whom a firm has spent $10,000 in training may suddenly decide to 
leave the firm. In the case of R & D, the information and products generaged 
may never yield a return to the firm. Their cost, therefore, is sunk immediately, 
 and may not be distributed over time. 
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Implications--Several implications may be drawn from the tax and accounting differences 
among allocation types. First, the impact of a sunk cost on the immediate 
financial performance of a firm or its sub-units will differ by allocation types. 
To the extent that managerial performance is frequently evaluated based, in 
part, on financial data, managers may be particularly sensitive to the treat-
ment of losses. Because expensed allocations constrain the decision maker to 
a single period and are not buffered by depreciation, the effect of a mistake 
here is probably most profound. Our hypothesis is that managers will prefer 
losses that can be written off over time to those which must be expense d 
immediately. This preference could have two effects. First, decision makers 
will be more risk-averse when making decisions regarding non-asset creating 
expenditures. Secondly, they will be more highly motivated to justify sunk 
costs that must be expensed. Several possible contingencies should be noted, 
however. Non-asset creating expenditures such as R & D have the characteristic 
of high risk, hence organizations in their performance appraisals of manacers 
may be more accepting of "mistakes" in that realm. Thirdly, the time fram 
in which R & D or training generate returns may be quite long. In fact, it 
is often not possible to evaluate the specific returns of such allocations. 
Again, organizations might avoid using these factors to evaluate managers. 
A second implication of the tax and accounting distinction concerns the 
flexibility afforded the allocator in covering his loss. Losses that may 
be spread over time afford several strategic advantages. First, in environments 
where career movement and managerial succession occur rapidly (e.g. the military), 
losses spread over time permit the decision maker to pass part of his sunk: 
costs on to his successor. Related to this observation is a tendency for new 
managers to write off such losses quickly upon taking over. 
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Secondly, the allocator may have an opportunity to "bury" his loss in 
future periods of favorable revenues. These alternative actions are 
important since they represent options available to the allocator in lieu of 
having to "justify" the sunk cost to others. 
A final implication, not independent of the others, concerns the 
representation of sunk costs. The existing literature on sunk costs leac!s us 
to think of then as immediate feedback which, contiguous with the decision, 
force the allocator to take actions which justify or remedy the past. This 
conception may be ecologically valid only in a limited set of circumstar.ces 
where costs are reported immediately (i.e. expensed) and future payoffs 
or changes in their likelihood may be rapidly assessed. The accounting literat u re 
suggest that such cases are more the exception than the rule. 
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MANAGERIAL DESCRIPTIONS OF SUNK COST EXPERIENCES  
In an attempt to learn more about the development and treatment of sunk 
costs in real allocation contexts, the investigators conducted focus group 
interviews with managers from a convenience sample of nine corporation. 
This sample included four corporations devoted essentially to the 
manufacturing, marketing and delivery of hard goods, four coiporatior.t 
devoted to the marketing and delivering of essential non—financial s : 
and one financial service organization. 	All of these were private sector 
firms. With the exception of the financial corporation and one of th•. 
manufacturing firms, interviews were held with small groups of top lev:1 
managers who were deemed by our various contacts in these organization to 
be or to have been centrally involved in financial allocation decision. 	In 
the financial corporation, two focus groups interviews were held, or witn 
corporate controllers and the other with credit managers. In one 
manufacturing firm, one—on—one interviews were held with three senior 
executives regarding a particular product which was removed from the ma' ,-:et 
partly because of sunk costs. 	In all cases, interviews were conducte at 
corporate headquarters with groups where at least one mem!-)er was a se!--;i 
level (i.e., Vice Presidential or above) executive. 	Group sizes varied f! 
two to six. 
The format used for the interviews was extremely non—directive. Triti<: 
were basically three phases to each interview. The first phase was devoted 
to having the managers define "sunk costs" and talk about how they al-- 
perceived and treated. The second phase asked managers to recall cases of 
decisions that involved sunk costs. The interviewers in this stage 
attempted to get the managers to describe what created the sunk cost, to 
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estimate its magnitude and implications, to describe the various actiJn 
alternatives available and/or taken in response to the sunk cost and finally 
the results of those actions. The last phase asked the interviewers 
summarize those factors which may have caused an allocator to consider 
costs when making allocations. 
The results of these interviews will be presented in two ways. Fire , 
we shall present a tabulation, and second, a set of general observa- , 
 about the nature of the sunk cost cases. 
Tabulation of the Cases  
Audio tapes were used to record the focus group interviews. The 
discussions fluctuated between general observations about decision 
and descriptions of specific case episodes. These case episodes wets ea 
to identify on the tapes because they were generally given as responsers 
the investigators' requests for specific examples of sunk cost decisions. 
A total of 16 cases were identified. The investigators, fot purposes 
of this tabulation, did not attempt to evaluate whether each case was a bo., 
fide instance of decision making with sunk costs, but left that judgeme 	to 
the interviewers who presented the case. These cases are tabulated in Tab, 
1 and are subdivided by allocations into four basic types: Mergers and 
Acquisitions, New Products, New Plant, Equipment or Processes and, finally, 
Normal Operations. 
Mergers and Acquisitions are attempts by a firm to secure a new 
operating company. They are acquisitions of ongoing businesses which may of 
may not be similar to the acquiring firm's ongoing business. New Products 
are allocations made to cover the costs of bringing new products or services 
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to market and, more specifically, may cover development costs, costs of 
establishing new technology for production and the costs of establishing new 
markets. New Plant, Equipment or Processes are allocations to acquire new 
capital or establishing new processes in ord,!1 to continue or become 
effective in the ongoing business. Normal Operations are expenditures mad, 
to cover everyday costs. 
The cases are described according to the type of business in 	 oe  
case originated, a brief description of the allocation, a brief descrit 
of the setback and why it occured and the current disposition of 
or project for which the allocation was made. 	These are larg,ly 
explanatory. 
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General Observations from the Cases  
Although the cases quite obviously differ in the types of allocations 
made, the types of setbacks that occured and the reasons for the setbacks, 
several themes emerged which appeared to be common across situations. These 
themes tended to involve three issues: How and why do sunk costs em ,,, rg€, 
how are they detectable and how they may affect decisions. 
Emergence--The first observation concerns the emergence of sunk costs. 
There were several themes that arose regarding emergence. First, it W2  
clear that nearly all of the managers preferred to view all allocations es 
in some way recoverable; that is, one should always be able to recover on,'& 
initial investment through sale or use. 	Sunk costs, therefore, were 
allocations which were no longer perceived as recoverable. 	Secondly, 
accept our set of cases as representative of the universe of sunk cost 
experiences, such (i.e., nonrecoverability) situations emerge when a fire 
allocates funds to a project with which it is comparatively unfamiliar  
(i.e., not a standard business activity). 	At least eight of our 1 ca 
represented situations where a firm was either doing something for the fir 
time or entering a domain (e.g., market, technology, region, etc.) with 
which it had no prior experience. For example, three of these involved the 
acquisition of subsidiaries where (1) the firm had never acquired a 
subsidiary before or (2) the subsidiary operated in a substantially 
different technology or environment than the acquiring firm. In the form. 
category was a large bank which, with the institution of statewide bankinE, 
acquired its first bank and although it was able to anticipate revenues, 
underestimated the "start—up—costs" associated with acquisition. In the 
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latter category, a firm acquired an overseas subsidiary which had previously 
been a licensed distributor of the acquiring firm's products. The acquiring 
firm failed to anticipate a variety of labor problems indiginous to the' 
country in which the subisidiary was located and its ability to effective 
change the way that things were being done in that firm. These problems 
were all attributed to some degree of naivete about the new work population. 
A third observation was that sunk costs generally involved underestimation 
of costs rather than overestimation of returns. This underestimation of 
costs often involved an underestimation of the amount of time and/or effol: 
necessary to initiate a new project. 	In one case, an entire sales team w.1, , 
 hired and sent out to sell a new machine a year before its prototype ws 
even operating. 	This resulted in a profit and loss statement which show. 
all costs and no revenues resulting from that selling effort. This was 
sufficient justification for the firm to discharge the sales force and 
remove the product from the market. 
To summarize the emergence issue, sunk costs appeared to be defined as 
non-recoverable expenditures. 	It was not always clear whether 
recoverability was defined by managers with a consideration of the tin: 
value of money. Sunk costs tended to result from situations where an 
important parameter in the decision involved a domain with which the firm 
had little or no experience such as a new market, a new politico-economic 
environment or a new technology. Finally, sunk costs often resulted not 
from an error in estimating the operations returns from an investment, but 
from the start-up costs associated with making an asset operational. 
Detection--The second observation concerns when and how sunk costs al( 
detected by managers in organizations. There are two aspects of detection. 
First, what constitutes a "cost"(?), and second, when is that cost deemed 
non—recoverable (?). These issues may appear to be simple but, in fact, 
they are quite problematic. From an accounting standpoint, one may wish to 
equate the term "cost" with a loss; that is, the degree to which a: 
investment fails to return its expected value is its cost. 	In fact, if w, 
relax the term "expected value" to pertain to the expected IettiT:Is of th, 
allocator, we obtain a good definition of sunk cost. 	To illustrate, one 
the cases obtained in our interviews concerned a firm's opening a brand -: 
office for a particular operating subsidiary in a city where the firm, a 
purveyor of services to business clients, provided services similar t_‘: 
not the same as those of the operating subsidialy. 	The rationale for 
opening this office was that many of the firm's largest clients were 
headquartered in the city and that the subsidiary needed a "presence" there 
in order to retain those clients as well as to bolster the parent company's 
image as a purveyor of a full line of services. Because of stiff 
competition in the subsidiary's particular service, it was anticipated tha 
the office would lose five million dollars over the first five veals. 
expectation, in fact, was externalized in the business plan. 	This loss 
legitimized by the allocators in three ways. 	First, it was expected that 
the office would eventually be profitable. 	Secondly, it was thoug'nt that 
the office was essential to keeping certain key clients. Lastly, it was 
felt that the office would enhance the visibility and profitability of thc_ 
firm's other operations in the city and, although these benefits could not 
be transferred by formal accounting, they would be attributable to tht 
office. 	It was clear on probing the managers that any loss less than the 
anticipated five million would be perceived as a "gain". The inference to 
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be drawn from this example, and similar other reports from the interviews, 
was that costs (and benefits) are identified relative to expectations that 
are often formalized in a business plan. 
The recoverability aspect of sunk costs is even more troubleso7,. Thy 
issue of exactly how managers deem expenditures to be non-recoverable  
probably cannot be answered in simplistic or even generalizable terms. Flom 
our cases, it appears that a multitude of factors including forecasted ‘,1 , st. 
and revenues, the centrality of an investment in a long range plan ac 
sometimes, managerial politics may affect the perception or labeling of 
investment as non-recoverable. For example, in the case of the ban 
acquisition, it was clear after the experiencing of the acquisition 
start-up costs, that using even the smallest reasonable discount rare, th-
acquisition would not recover those costs. 	It was interesting that these  
costs are now omitted from periodic performance assessments. 	In this cas, 
normal accounting was indicative of sunk costs. 	In the case of the bransr .: 
office, recoverability was largely a matter of faith in (1) the long-ter T.
viability of the office and (2) the "spill-over" effects to other division, 
which, under normal accounting, could not be verified. 	The potential rc- 
of politics in determining recoverability is evident in the case of the 
product which was marketed one full year before its prototype was fully d,- 
bugged and operational. 	In this case, there was sufficient evidence that 
the product, once ready, would likely be the most profitable (in terms of 
mark-up) of any in the company. The profit and loss statement for that one 
year, however, served to legitimize its removal. More important in the 
decision to remove, however, was the lack of fit of this product with the 
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existing product line and markets served by the firm and the absence of a 
top—level advocate for the product. 
In summary, the detectability of sunk costs depends on the differen .:e 
between the allocator's perceptions of the returns accruing from an 
allocation and his/her expectations with regard to those returns. 	It is 
also important that the allocator view those losses as permanent (i.e 
recoverable). The determinantion of when costs become sunk is problematical 
because recoverability depends on expectations of future performance, 	In 
our interviews, we encountered both instances where patience in the face of 
losses was a vice and those where it was a virtue. Perhaps the best 
statement to make about detection is that costs are deemed "sunk" when, f—
some reason, a consensus is reached about the advisability of not attemin 
their recovery. The degree to which this decision may be supported by 
formal analyses depends both on the extent to which costs and benefits are 
reducable to monetary terms and the extent to which the management invoiN:eu 
desire such verification. 
Impact on Decisions--A final observation concerns the manner 	* 
sunk costs impact future decisions. Viewing this from Stay's "coJtse Df 
action" perspective, a sunk cost is a failed allocation in some 
interdependent sequence of actions. The impact of these failures on 
subsequent decisions depends on the nature of the interdependency. Six 
types of interdependency can be identified in the cases. 
The most frequent form of interdependency was financial. Even failuies 
can create assets and the existence of ready assets may affect subsequent 
decisions. An example of this from our cases was a firm that because it had 
a full inventory of parts devoted to old engines, delayed the replacement of 
the old engines with new, more efficient ones even though the cost-
effectiveness of the delay could be questioned. The major issue is that 
large, immediate write-offs can have an important impact on the confidence 
that investors, suppliers and clients may hold toward a firm. 	In Stab  
Ross's (197 ) World Bank case, financial assets are also created which have._  
an important impact on the return on investments associated with futtlie 
allocations to the failed project. 
A second type of interdependence concerns environment and maiket. 
Resource allocations can sometimes constitute commitments to constituenciL•s 
external to a firm. One firm gave the example of two unprofitable plants, 
one located in a major urban center, the other in a semi-rural community. 
The firm closed down its urban facility, but reallocated its rural facility 
to a more profitable operating division. 	The reason was that in the small 
town, the firm was a major employer and had a felt commitment to the 
community. A somewhat different example was a firm's retaining certain 
unprofitable product lines because of either believed interdependencies with 
other profitable products (e. g., the ability to sell a complete system\ 
felt prior commitments to clients that they would continue to carry 
product. 
A third type of interdependency concerns technological consideration. 
One firm gave an example of resurrecting and modifying an old prototype in 
bidding on new business to fit the needs of new potential clients. The 
reasons for this were two-fold. First, the development costs associated 
with the new bid would probably be lower, but it was also the case that the 
felt risk of the bidding firm was also less. 	Stated a bit differently, thc 
bidders felt that because all of the necessary steps through producing a 
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prototype had already been taken, many of the uncertainties involved in 
product pricing, especially those involving start-up costs, had already been 
eliminated. In a way, these are really "sunk benefits". We have labeled 
such considerations technological, because they involve the impact of 
allocations, even failures, on learning how to do things and the 
contingencies that ultimately affect success and/or failure. 	Genera: 
speaking, the more complex the technology or process that is being dealt 
with, the more likely will be the sunk benefits of prior experience, 
A fourth form of interdependency involved strategic resource 
utilization. 	These interdependencies would be most likely in contexts whir 
state-of-the-art technologies create areas of special expertise which canet 
easily be bought in the labor market. 	In such cases, a firm might continL 
a failing project and incurr further costs just to have something for key 
personnel to do before a new project is initiated. One firm gave th€ 
example of a project from which the management never expects to directly  
benefit, that is periodically resurrected to keep strategically impoita: 
teams of engineers and designers busy. 
A fifth and extremel .,, interesting interdependency involved culoota:t  
strategy. 	Strategy produces interdependency by (1) creating general them,, 
policy or plans that place particular allocations in some sequence of 
intended actions and (2) providing institutional support and justificatio.1 
for actions. The most obvious forms such strategies take are the long-term 
business plan and statement of corporate policy and objectives. In these 
forms, the jointly defined strategies of top management become externalized 
and give the appearance of consensus on "where a company is going". 
Consequently, such plans are potentially powerful tools for justifying 
21 
actions. In our cases, we saw an instance of corporate strategy, in part, 
justifying a five year loss in the branch office case, and strategy, in 
part, justifying the removal of a product whose per unit profit potential 
was greater than any other in the firm. The interesting aspect of this 
process is that the economic wisdom of a given strategy (i.e., compared to 
alternatives) is generally more difficult to objectively ascertain and 
verify than that of any single investment decision and, therefore, the 
of a plan to justify a particular decision is not necessarily economically 
rational. Nonetheless, strategy appears to be an important force in 
determining the persistence of allocators in the face of successes or 
failures. 
The sixth and final type of interdependence is personal. This typ, of 
interdependency has been Staw's major focus and refers to individual b, iefs 
that decisions are somehow linked with regard to their implications fu: th 
person. For example, an attempt to "recover" sunk costs by allocating 
additional funds may be motivated by self—justification or justification 
others. Both of these are attempts to protect one's self—image or 
reputation, hence this concern for image becomes a personal factor 
two or more decisions. This factor was noted explicitly in one of our ca-7- 
where a losing subsidiary was retained because of the corporate president's 
involvement in its acquisition. The decision to retain was, importantly, 
made against the loud protest of corporate comptrollers and strategists. 
The idea of ego protection was also noted in two other interviews. 
In summary, the interviews served to identify and illustrate six ways 
in which decisions may be interdependent. These were: 	financial, 
environmental, technological, strategic resource utilization, strategic and 
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personal interdependency. An important distinction among these, we believe, 
is the degree to which these interdependencies are objectifiable. At one 
end of a continuum are financial interdependencies which are generally 
objectifiable through standard accounting procedures. At the other end 
personal interdependencies which may be quite idiosyncratic and, theref,:l,, 
difficult to objectify. Objectification may be related to justificatio 
Specifically, we propose that objectified interdependencies are useful 
external justifications. For example, if one can show that the must 
economically rational use of ten million dollars is to complete a partially 
finished project that has been beset by past failure, one's present acH.o7 
are fairly well protected from criticism and perhaps, one's past failures  
become fairly well buffered. 	In contrast, ont's ideosyncracies and ne,?d 
protect ego are not typically viable external justifications when evaluated 
against norms for rationality. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING PARADIGM  
Two case scenarios, "The A & S Financial Decision Case" (Staw, 1976; 
Staw & Fox, 1977; Fox and Staw, 1979 and "The World Bank Study" (5, taw an! 
Ross, 1978), have been used in the previous research on escalation bert - ,- 
 For both cases, students, acting as financial allocation officers, we:e 
asked to select from among several alternative projects the one deserving  
a fixed amount of resource funding. 	Subsequent to this decision, feedback 
was provided to subjects indicating (either the success of) a setback to the 
chosen project. Following this feedback, subjects were instructed to make a 
decision concerning the financial amount to be allocated to the previously 
funded project or to an alternative project. 	In all studies the dependent 
variable of interest was the dollar amount allocated during this second 
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phase of the previously funded project. Two independent variables were 
manipulated: a) the responsiblity for an initial decision that b) resulted 
in a positive/negative outcome. 
A number of problems exist, in these case scenarios. First, the 
ecological validity of each study is suspect. Although the cases attempted 
to simulate the types of decisions faced by allocators, the amount of 
information presented in the studies did not allow the use of a normative 
model for financial calculations. Second, the absence of this information 
may have lead decision makers to base their decisions upon certain 
assumptions which they formed in order to act in the normative fashion. 
Third, due to bounds on the information presented in the scenarios and 
consequent assumptions which were not controlled for by explicit data 
pertaining to expected value; a number of alternative explanations exist 
creating potential problems with internal validity. Thus, interpretation of 
the literature on commitment is problematic. 
The A & S Financial Decision Case  
The A & S Financial Decision Case was based on ten years of histori:a: 
data for sales and earnings of two R & D divisions. Subjects, serving 
the role of Financial Vice President, were asked to allocate $10 
dollars to one of the two divisions. This historical data (for each 
division) indicated that although sales had increased in a somewhat linear 
fashion, earnings had decreased in a similar linear fashion. Both divisions 
now reported losses in earnings varying between .63 and .80 million dollars. 
Feedback provided after the initial allocation was in the form of five 
additional years of historical financial information. For the manipulated 
improvement condition, sales increased significantly in the 5 year period 
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and earnings had returned to profitable levels. For the manipulated decline 
condition, although sales had increased a lower rate than in the immediately 
preceeding 5 years, earnings had suffered a deepening decline. At this 
time, subjects were instructed to make a second allocation based upon the 
potential for future earnings. Their task was to divide $20 million dollars  
between the two R & D divisions. 
From the limited information provided in the case scenario, it appears 
that subjects were expected to perceive a linkage between previous R & D 
funding and financial performance over the intervening 5 year period. As no 
information was provided regarding future earnings or sales, however, 
calculation of either the likelihood of returns or the valuation of the. 
returns would be based on assumptions that an increase in earnings would 
solely a function of R & D expenditures. 
Although this may have been the case, a more reasonable explanation. is 
that subjects experienced uncertainty due to the limited information 
available. As a result, an experimenting strategy may have been utilizei" in 
an attempt to gain additional information. 
In addition, the original $10 million dollars was budgeted bv 
company's directors who (according to the case) had concluded that the- 
additional sum should be made available to major operating divisions. Aftel 
the initial allocation was made and feedback provided, subjects were told 
that "the management of the company is convinced that there is an even 
greater need for expenditure on research and development". Therefore, as a 
result of funding being budgeted and explicityly supported by top 
management, allocators in the A & S Financial Decision Case may have 
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perceived less responsibility on their part for any negative consequences 
that might result. 
Considering the results obtained in a followup study by Staw and Fox 
(1977) which examined these results over an additional time period, it 
appears that information gained by observed outcomes (e.g. negative 
consequences) may have played the more important role in decisions to 
continue allocations. That is, subjects receiving negative feedback undi 
conditions of high responsibility (e.g. choice) after the second funding 
decision, allocated significantly lower amounts at time three. This 
behavior, suggesting reactance (Brehm, 1966), points to limitations to 
inferences that justification served to direct the effects of allocation 
behaviors. 
The World Bank Study  
In contrast to the A & S Financial Decision Case where subjects 
decisions concerning R & D expenditures, the world bank case required 
financial decisions regarding an industrial complex in an overseas natio n . 
While playing the role of financial officer in the World Bank, sil5f7t:,  
made initial decisions on the selection of one of three regions in Nis,: 
to build a hydroelectric dam. 	Stew and Ross (1978) then provided negativ , 
 feedback to one half of the subjects while the other half received pos Liv
feedback. This manipulation was conducted in order to create what the 
researchers termed a "history of success/failure". After completing this 
decision and receiving feedback, subjects then turned to a seond decision in 
the case packets concerning the establishment of an industrial complex i. 
one of three locations in Kenya. After a region was selected for the site 
all subjects received information that a setback had occurred. The feedback 
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outlined that although $70 million of the original $80 million allocated was 
spent a) the project was only 50% completed due to b) unexpected heavy rain 
or an expected cause endogenous to the region chosen for the complex. 
Subjects were then requested to make allocations ranging from 0 to S7u 
million with nonassigned funds remaining with the World Bank for expenditure 
in future development projects. 
Although the information environment utilized in this scenario is 0- 1 
 patially bounded, a number of issues arise with respect to the feedback 
provided to subjects. First, the subjects were told that the project 
was only 50% completed. Based on this data, subjects now were required 
assume that either the same expenditure would complete the project (e.g. 
million plus the remaining $10 million from the previous allocation) 01 
half of the original allocation would suffice (e.g. $30 million). 
This calculation would be based upon assuptions/perceptions of subi,:t. 
regarding the likelihood of the setback reoccuring. That is, it the cause 
of the setback was perceived as being persistent, then the larger amounr 
should have been allocated. 	However, although these calculating strategies 
were available due to the partially structured nature of the case scenari(, 
calculation is not guaranteed. Therefore an uncontrolled source of varian 
exists due to differnces in cognitive processing on the part of decision 
makers. 
Third, subject may have formed different assumptions about the 
probability of altering the cause of the setback. This issue is 
particularly important when considering the three expected causes endogenous 
to the region chosen for the complex. Staw and Ross (1978) provided three 
endogenous/foreseeable causes for the setback. These included: corruption 
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of local officials, ineffective work incentives and illiteracy. Among the 
reported mean allocations for each of these three endogenous setbacks a 
large discrepancy exists when a prior history of failure existed (corrupt- Din 
= 16.5, work incentives - 21.7, illiteracy - 47.5). 	In addition, subject's 
self reports on the likelihood of the persistence of the problem and theil 
beliefs that additional funding would alleviate the problem followed an. 
expected pattern based on the above means. Specifically, in the condition 
of setbacks involving illiteracy where the highest allocations occurred 
among the endogenous causes, subjects reported a significantly lower beI ef 
in persistence of the problem and a significantly higher belief that tht 
problem could be alleviated. 	If subjects calculate based upo-, the 
information provided in the scenario, the assumptions that they possess  
regarding the persistence/fixability of the setback could also interact wit'!' 
calculations to control allocations. 
Finally, a point regarding the assumptions that subjects may have had 
with respect to recoverability of the investment warrant's discussion. 
the decision to allocate funds in the World Bank Study were asset creati 
decision makers may have assumed that these costs were not sunk as t;, 
future use or sale of the industrial complex would provide recoverability 
the allocations to some degree. Because the subjects were undergraduates 
from the College of Commerce and Business Administration, they may have 
attended to the useful life aspect of the Nigerian industrial complex. 
As a result of these problems-the ambiguous nature of the data, 
variance due to calculating/noncalculating strategies, a potential 
interaction of calculation and persistence/fixability of setbacks and 
possible assumptions regarding the creation of assets leading to 
recoverability potential—the internal validity of this study is 
questionable. 
In summary, previous scenarios as designed by Staw and his associate=  
lack a normative information environment. Consequently, assumptions held by 
individuals attempting to act normatively may be the basis for variance 
allocations behaviors. The feedback provided in the former study did n -Jt 
allow for calculation (A & S Financial Decision Case) while the infDima:: 
regarding the setback in the latter case permitted a more calculating 
strategy (The World Bank Study). 	In the first study, uncertainty 	toy 
lack of a normative information may have directed subjects to experiment 
with allocations in hopes of gaining additional information. 	On the othiJI 
hand, the causes for the setback presented in The World Bank Study may hay, 
been perceived and interpreted differently by subjects with respect to th ,.- 
persistence of the setbacks. Calculation may have interacted with 
perceptions of persistence. 	These issues pose threats to the inter,lal 
validity of the results. 	Thus, any inference that justification is a--; 
explanation for escalation is tenuous given the scenarios 	 t 
studies. 
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RESEARCH AGENDA  
The information, observations and critiques presented above serve t 
suggest several directions that research and, ultimately, theorizing shoJid 
take in the area of decision making with sunk costs. We suggest, here an 
agenda which will first attempt to resolve some of the ambiguities 
associated with prior studies and then expand investigation. 
Step One: Enabling Normative Models  
We have attempted to show how the lack of sufficient information i7 th 
cases used in prior research threatens both their external and internal 
validity. Future research should be designed, like most behavioral de.:1 
making research, in a way that systematic deviations from normative behavior 
may be observed. 	In the case of financial allocations, that means desiv: , 
cases and other stimuli that provide enough information for decision mak 
to utilize the decision models provided in the financial literature. Tht'sc 
models, then, provide the normative benchmark against which actual 
allocations may be compared. 
Once the normative benchmarks are developed, several classes of 
questions may be asked. The most obvious of these is how do the actual 
allocations made deviate from those which would be normatively prescribed? 
A similar strategy was used by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in the discovery 
of common heuristics used by people in probability judgement tasks. Another 
question, however, concerns what people do when insufficient information is 
provided. For example, does a decision maker who wants to follow a 
normative model switch to some other model when information is insufficient, 
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or does he/she make guesses about the missing data to "fill in the blanks". 
If the latter is true, how are these guesses made? Are they systematically 
biased? Are they sensitive to situational cues and/or individual 
differences? It seems that such questions have both theoretical and 
practical importance. 
Step Two: Broaden the Dependent Variable  
The research to date on allocations has operationalized the dependent 
variable as an amount allocated from some a pool of available funds, 
sometimes with explicit opportunity costs and sometimes without them. 	It 
should be noted that in organizational resource allocations, the total siz 
of the resource pie and the number and nature of allocation opportunities 
available may be important factors affecting allocation behavior. 
suggest that future studies be sensitive to these factors and, in addition, 
recognize that allocations alone may not be particularly informative abou ._ 
decision behavior following sunk costs. 
The Nigerian Dam example can be used to illustrate. 	Suppose that, 
following the first allocation, the dam is 4/5 completed and because  
officials have stolen the other 1/5 those funds are not recoverable. 
Suppose further that construction costs have remained constant and that an 
allocation of ten million or 1/5 the original allocation without further 
corruption, would finish the dam. 	If the allocator spends 12.5 million, 
what can we assume about his behavior. Some possible inferences are: 	(1) 
He is so commited to the project because of prior responsibility inductions 
that he has allocated more than necessary (i.e., escalating commitments), 
(2) He assumes that local officials regularly skim 20%, so he has allocated 
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enough so that, with 20% skimmed, the project can be completed (i.e, 
learning without attempts to eliminate the setback), or (3) He has spent an 
additional 2.5 million to police the situation and hopefully capture and 
punish the corrupt officials (i.e., learning with attempts to remedy the 
setback). The standard methodology of obtaining only the allocation data 
provides no information for differentiating among these three respons 
modes, although each may have very different theoretical implication s . 
One way to approach this problem is to collect, along with the actual 
allocation data, indicators of the allocator's rationale for making L11.:7' 
allocation. A very good way to collect such data because it minimizes 
possibility that the allocator's rationale is a post hoc rationalization 
some other process, is to collect "thinking aloud" verbal protocals as th• 
decision is being made. These protocols may then be examined, along wit h 
the actual allocation made, and used to test a priori hypotheses. 
Step Three: Refine and Investigate the Course of Action Concept  
The cases suggest a variety of ways in which a sequence of decisions 
may be interdependent. We suggest that these interdependencies creaL, 
Staw (1981) has labeled courses of action. 	It may be reasonable to as boo 
the nature of these interdependencies affects the allocation process. 
potential importance of interdependencies may be shown by example. 
Staw (1981) provides five examples of courses of action. A compar_s-, ,,I 
of two of these illustrates why interdependencies are critical. One examgie 
is Chicago's "Deep Tunnel" project to improve its sewer and drainage system. 
The project is the largest public works project ever in the nation and 
involves digging 131 miles of tunnels, shafts, resevoirs and pumping 
stations. 	In Staw's example, the project is 10% complete and useless unless 
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totally finished. A second example is a stock purchased at $50/share whose 
price drops to $20/share. The decision maker buys more shares and the price 
drops further and the decision maker is faced with a sell, hold or buy 
decision. 
These two situations differ greatly in the kind of interdependenci es 
they create between decisions. In Deep Tunnel, all previous expenditute:, 
create an asset that, in effect, enhance the rate of return on the 
additional amount necessary to begin enjoying returns. For example, if six 
billion has been invested, and the project is expected to yield one billion 
pei year in cost savings on a total investment of 11 billion, the annu=l 
non-discounted rate of return on the additional five billion to finish the 
project is 20%. We have labled this type of interdependency financial. 
stock purchase situation has no such interdependency. From a financial 
viewpoint, the rate of return on additional stock purchased is totally 
unaffected by prior purchases. Any perceived interdependency present in the 
stock example must be created by factors other than financial considerations 
such as strategic or personal/ cognitive interdependencies. The notion thb 
a decision maker may think of the entire sstock holding or portfoli._ 
making his/her decision is a cognitive biasing factor which could ead to 
economically incorrect decision. 
The interdependency issue appears to be important for several reasons. 
Firstly, for financial interdependencies, a set of optimizing rules may 
apply which can assist the decision maker in making the decision justifying 
his/herself to self and others. In fact, as suggested above, the concept of 
justifiability may be a a factor deemed important by existing theory, on 
which all six forms of interdependencies can be systematically ordered. 
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Secondly, the form of interdependency may interact with other situational 
variables in its effect on allocations. For example, the visibility of an 
allocation may exacerbate the impact of a personal interdependency. 
Finally, there are important implications of the interdependency notion 
the study of managerial policy and strategy. For example, if strateg e ca7-, 
he used by managers to justify specific actions, are specific actions an'31 
their success or failure ever used to evaluate and justify strategy? State.: 
another way, some of the ideas found in Staw's courses of action notions any 
expanded through our cases carry implications for how effectively manaztrs 
may learn from their decision making experiences. The entire issue of 
learning and the effect of success/failure on decision behavior over tin 
would seem to be an important adjunct to this line of investigation. 
Step 4: Expanding the Variable Set  
The examination of the normative models and the cases presented he:; 
suggest a set of ecologically important factors which may be operationaliz,d 
and investigated in future studies. Some of these have already been allud, 
to such as the interdependency concept, the presence of full information,  
and the resource scarcity and opportunity cost ideas. There are, however, 
variety of additional concepts which should be examined. Among these al,: 
(1) the impact of being able to spread losses over time, (2) the overall 
financial condition of the firm, (3) the size of allocations, (4) whether-
the allocation is an individual or group decision and (5) the stage in the 
life cycle of the entity at which the allocation is made. 
These four steps are presented in a sequence that appears to be 
logical; that is, step one should be investigated prior to step two, because 
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the results of step one may have important implications for the design of 
step two studies. We in no way imply that this list represents an 
exhaustive set of the important research issues surrounding allocation 
decisions with sunk costs. This list represents those issues which appealed 
evident given the results of the focus group interview., and our examina: 
of normative financial models. 
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Summary and Conclusions  
We have attempted to demonstrate that the internal and ecological 
validity of those studies known as commitment and escalation research is 
suspect. The basis for arguement has been a comparison of the information 
provided in the case scenarios used in these studies with the informatics::  
required by normative models of financial allocations. We have also usec:_ 
the results of case studies of sunk cost situations to identify comm_ , r; 
contextual variables which might be integrated into future research. 
We can neither conclude that prior studies and resulting theorys are 
wrong or right. Our conclusion is simply that research can and should 
designed to eliminate some of the difficulties with the previous resealcri. 
Frankly, we expect that many of the conclusions from prior studies will 
prove valid. We believe, however, that the present analyses suggests 1s :ts 
and a direction that will provide a more accurate and unified theJly 
decision making with sunk costs than would a collection of studies modi 
strictly on the previous research on the topic. 
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TABLE 1  
A Tabulation of the Sunk Cost Cases 
rgers and Acquisitions  






Brief Description  
Overseas acquisition. 
Firm buys former over-
seas licensee 
Bought a small firm 




Bought a small 
bank. 










start up costs, 
overpaid. 
Current Disposition  
Still holding 
Paid 300,000 to dives 
Still holding. Bank 
is still profitable 
when ignore start up 
costs. 
Products 






Brief Description  
Entered new emerging 
market with new 
products. 
Designed new product 
for a certain large 
customer's use. 
Designed, assembled 
and marketed a new 
product that would 
serve a new market 
for the firm. 
Cause of Setback  
*Entered market 5 
years too early, 
carrying costs 
not recouped. 













costs due to 
marketing expenses 
with no established 
product. 





*Product is not 
actively markete d 
but could easily 
be ressurected. 
*No longer marketin 
or producing the 
product,looking to 
sell the concept. 
*Rapid technological *Phasing-in new 
change spurred on 
by fuel costs. 
assemblys while 
trying to deplete 
existing parts 
inventory. 
*High start up and 	*Nearly gave up and 
carrying costs 	sold machine. 
because of time Process was saved 
lage due to (1) 	by 11th hour 
perfecting processes approval. 





costs due to slow 
development, 
delivery and vendor 
monopoly. 
*Immediate write-
off and purchase. 
*Fired vendor, took  





i Plant Equipment or Processes  
Brief Description  
Plants devoted to 
certain unprofitable 




prior to full 
depreciation. 
Firm opened branch 
office expecting to 
lose 5 million over 
5 years. 
Old engine parts 




dollar piece of 
equipment to make 
engine repairs 





Firm purchased a 
computer to eliminate 
an large, labor 
intensive sequence of 
tasks. Were dis-
satisfied with progress 
and price of 
implementation. 















Cause of Setback 
	
Current Disposition  
*Weak markets 
	
*Closed one plant, 
reallocated others 
to different divisions 
*Rapid change in 
	
*Write off old 
technology 	 machines and bought 
new ones imLediatel 
*Competitive 
	
Now in 3rd year, 
market with high 
	
losing as expected. 
start up costs. 






the type of project. 
*Did not bid. 
TABLE 1 
(Continued) 
Brief Description  
Firm spent $25,000 
preparing an invited 
bid on a very large 
project, then 
declined to bid. 
Firm spent a large 
amount on an 
advertising campaign 













Lost use of the 
concept being 
promoted. 
*Some designs 	*Accept that risk 
may never recoup 	and take losses on 
development 	 such items. 
costs. 
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MAKING DOLLARS & SENSE OF SUNK COSTS 
(or, When Might it be Rational 
to Throw Good Money After Bad?) 
In the eyes of managers, sunk costs are resources allocated 
which are not recoverable. In talking about sunk costs, it is 
useful to distinguish between expenses and investments of 
resources in projects. 	In any venture, resources allocated to 
a project are expected to be recovered by generating some form 
(monetary or otherwise) of revenue later in the project. 	But 
there are two quite different forms of resource recovery: 
resale and use. 	Resale is a matter of liquidation, so that 
resources are recovered directly from wherever allocated. This is 
the realm of investments. 	In real estate investment, for 
instance, a piece of land is purchased for $80,000, then later 
resold for $100,000. 	In between, the land may remain unused, but 
that is irrelevant to its role in generating revenue. Its ability 
to generate revenue occurs directly through its resale after 
appreciation. 	Contrast that with a piece of machinery (see 
Horngren, 1982). 	A piece of machinery may be purchased for 
$600,000, but have a salvage (or resale) value of only $70,000. 
But the resale value is irrelevant to the machinery's role in 
generating revenue. Its ability to generate revenue occurs 
indirectly through its use in turning raw materials into finished 
products, and thereby generating a revenue stream independent of 
its resale value. This is the realm of expenses. 
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The crucial differences between expenses and investments lies 
in (i) directness of resource recovery, and (ii) intentionality of 
loss. For an expense, resources are intentionally allocated 
where direct recovery is known to be a losing proposition, but 
where indirect recovery (through use) is believed to be 
profitable. In the above example, the company purchasing the 
$600,000 machinery accepts the direct loss of $530,000, fully 
anticipating an indirect recovery through use of at least 
$530,000. The land speculator does not invest in land intending 
to lose money directly on it, because there is no way for unused 
land to indirectly generate revenue. Land, of course, presents an 
exception that proves the rule. A rental property may be 
purchased for $80,000 and then later resold for $70,000, where the 
$10,000 loss is an expense. This would occur if the land 
generated rental income, and hence the revenue-generating role of 
the property were indirect (much like the machinery noted above.) 
In the terms of this distinction, a "sunk cost" is an 
intentional direct loss of allocated resources (an expense) in 
anticipation of indirect recovery (through use.) Investments 
which are resold after depreciation or before appreciation simply 
generate losses. Expenses which are not recovered indirectly 
(through use) before a project is terminated also generate losses, 
but specifically because Dr ,sunk costs. 
Commitment and Sunk Costs  
The literature on decision-making has attempted to 
understand how sunk costs influence psychological commitment, and 
thereby the financial commitment of further resources in the face 
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of negative feedback on the initial investment decision (e.g., 
Staw, 1981). The underlying themes of this research have been 
that: (i) psychological commitment promotes further financial 
commitment in the face of negative feedback on initial 
investments, and (ii) this behavior is apparently irrational 
(throwing good money after bad, as it were.) 
Perhaps the psychological appeal of such behavior lies in the 
notion of recovery through use. Faced with negative feedback (a 
certain loss through cost-overrun or revenue-shortfall,) the 
decision-maker may feel compelled to continue the project to its 
natural (albeit costly) conclusion, whereby recovery through use 
would be maximized, and loss through sunk costs minimized. 
Intuitively, this seems a rather appealing strategy. However, the 
behavior becomes irrational (as we shall see later) when the 
return-on-investment afforded through recovery through use is less 
than that afforded by competing investment opportunities. 
However, as this paper will show, the fact that resources 
have been sunk (intentional direct loss) into a project and 
negative feedback received does not per se make further financial 
commitment either wise or unwise. In fact, the wisdom of further 
commitment of resources to a project in the face of negative 
feedback will be shown to depend upon four factors: (i) the type 
of return-on-investment curve associated with a project, (ii) the 
stage in a project's life-cycle at which point the decision is 
being made, (iii) the nature (magnitude) of the negative feedback 
received, and (iv) the process by which the resource allocator is 
evaluated. 
Ine. type of return-on-investment curve  
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A graphic representation of return-on-investment analysis for 
a project is shown in Figure I. The profit line corresponds to 
the expected return-on-investment for the entire project (EROI). 
If one assumes that a project is only started because the 
projected return-on-investment for the entire project is 
satisfactory, then the EROI constitutes a criterion for evaluating 
the goodness of any projected return-on-investment for the 
commitment of the remaining resources to a project, at any point 
in a project. 
We can imagine four different kinds of return-on-investment 
curves for a project. These are derived from examining the 
changes in the projected return-on-investment for the commitment 
of further resources to a project, throughout the course of 
different projects. This projected return-on-further-investment 
(or PROFI) is of interest precisely because this rationally should 
be the measure by which to judge whether further resources should 
be committed. For instance, if competing available investment 
opportunities offer a 20% EROI, a PROFI of 21% for commitment of 
further resources to a partially completed project would be worth 
putting money into; a PROFI of 19% would not. Anytime the PROFI 
falls to a value which is less than the EROI, then return-on-
investment for further resource commitment would be less than 
satisfactory, i.e. less that what is available through competing 
investment opportunities. 
Graphically, this comparison of EROI and PROFI is quite 
simple to make. A PROFI line can be addded to the return-on-
investment picture by drawing a line from the current point on the 
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project life-cycle curve to some point corresponding to further 
commitment of resources, such as the conclusion of the project. 
The resulting line (line A' in Figure I) will have a slope equal 
to the revenues obtained by further commitment of resources to the 
project, divided by the further resources committed. Whether 
further commitment of resources to a project is rational is then 
simply a matter of whether the slope of line A' is greater than or 
equal to the slope of the profit line (rational to commit further 
resources to the project,) or less than the slope of the profit 
line (rational to divert resources to other available investment 
opportunities.) 
Three other features of these curves are worthy of note. 
First, the "break-even" line is irrelevant to return-on-investment 
decisions. Since the profit line represents the value of 
competing opportunities, it constitutes the only true "break-even" 
line. 	Only the profit line incorporates the opportunity costs of 
money into the break even notion. 	Second, liquidation value of a 
project is project external or market dependent. 	Anytime a PROFI 
is being calculated, the liquidation or salvage value of the 
project that counts is not what the managers of the project think 
the project is worth, but what it will bring on the market. After 
all, if a project is terminated prematurely, resource recovery 
will be in terms of what others are willing to pay. Finally, it 
should be noted that the preceeding discussion tacitly assumed 
that the value of competing available opportunities is a constant 
through the life-cycle of a project. This is clearly not always 
true. Therefore, when making graphic comparisons between PROFI 
and profit line slopes, one must be careful to use the profit 
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line slope of the best available investment opportunity, rather 
than the profit line slope with which the project was begun. 
The four types of return-on-investment curves are: 
Type 1.1. constant PROFI. Figure II shows a project life-cycle 
in which PROFI is constant throughout the entire life-cyclke of 
the project. 	An example of this would be a savings account, 
accruing interest daily on committed funds. Notice that there are 
not sunk costs in such a return-on-investment curve. At any point 
all committed resources can be recovered. 	Also notice that any 
PROFI for such a project is always equal to the profit line slope 
at any point in the project (assuming the profit line slope 
doesn't itself change) precisely because PROFI always falls on the 
profit line. 
Type II: 	continuous variable PROFI. 	Figure III shows a project 
life-cycle in which PROFI varies over the life-cycle cf the 
project. Specifically, there are sunk costs (intentional direct 
losses) at the beginning of the project (for instance, set-up 
costs, or equipment expenditures) which must be charged off 
against income received by the end of the project. Manufacturing 
presents good examples of this -- where materials and machines 
must be purchased, designs drawn up, and workers trained before 
any income is realized. Because income is not being generated 
while the sunk costs are being sunk (or perhaps income is not 
being generated at the rate sunk costs are being sunk,) the PROFI 
must te higher after the sunk costs are sunk than before, in order 
to recoup the sunk costs. Only if the PROFI is higher after sunk 














Figure II : constant PRORI 
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Units of Resources Committed 
Figure IV : discontinuous 
variable PRORI 
pro it line 
Units of Resources Committed 
the entire project become equal to the EROI at the beginning of 
the project. This creates a situation during the sinking of sunk 
costs where the PROFI is always increasing relative to the EROI 
for the entire project, since costs figured into the EROI are 
being spent, but benefits figured into the EROI are not yet being 
realized. 
Example: Let's say that a manufacturing firm expects a total 
return on investment for a project of 20% for a 
new line of office furniture. Production and 
distribution cannot begin until $100,000 of 
equipment has been purchased, with a resale 
value of only $60,000 after use. At any point 
in the project after any money has been sunk 
into the equipment, the projected return-on-
investment for remaining resources committed to 
the project must be greater than 20%, in order 
to recoup the $40,000 cost sunk into the equip-
ment. 
Type III: 	discontinuous variable PROFI. 	Figure IV shows a 
special case of the continuous variable PROFI, where no benefits 
are begin realized (i.e., no liquidation or salvage is accruing) 
until the very end of the project life-cycle, at which point all 
benefits accrue. An example of this would be the building of a 
bridge, or the construction of a pedestrian subway. For such 
projects, there may be little or no market for partially completed 
projects, and hence little or no salvage value to resources 
committed to the project until it is completed. After all, who 
would want to buy a couple of posts truly sunk into the middle of 
a river? Waiting in a bus line, or being put on hold on the 
telephone would also seem to fit this mold (see Rubin & Brockner, 
1975). 
In fact, one can imagine a family of curves of Type II, 
ranging from Type I to Type III, depending upon (i) the proportion 
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of sunk costs necessary to get the project off the ground 
(compared to the total budget for the project,) and (ii) the speed 
at which these sunk costs are being recovered. It also should be 
noted that these curves need not be monotonically increasing 
(despite the fact that all the examples have been drawn that way.) 
The project life-cycle curves might meander up and down in various 
ways throughout the life-cycle of the project. In terms of PROFI 
analysis, this might mean that it might make sense to commit some 
amount of resources to completion of a project which gets the 
project to a local maximum on the project life-cycle curve, 
without commiting enough resources to complete the project. (This 
should become apparent later, when the impact of negative feedback 
on PROFI analysis is discussed in further detail.) 
Tyne IV: 	PROFI-inappropriate projects. 	The curve for this type 
of project may look like any member of the Type II family, except 
that for this type of project, PROFI analysis is inappropriate. 
There might be two reasons for this. First, some projects are 
undertaken not because they are cost-effective, but because they 
are effective period. For example, PROFI analysis may be 
inappropriate to understanding the funding of a war, or research 
on some acute disease cricis. Statements like, "HANG the 
expense," or "Whatever it costs, it's worth it" are traditionally 
associated with such projects. 	Another way of saying this is to 
note that such projects are dominated by outcomes. 	It may be 
worth just about anything to avoid losing a war if it means being 
sold into slavery. 	There are limits to this perspective, of 
course. 	It is not worth selling oneself into slavery to one 
group to gain their protection from another. But within limits, 
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PROFI may simply be the wrong kind of question to ask for some 
projects. Interestingly, the World Bank problem (Stave & Fox, 
1977; Conlon & Wolf, 1980) may be of this type. 
A second possibility for the inappropriateness of PROFI 
analysis arises when the benefits of a project are not easily 
specifiable, or not easily quantifiable. This would render the 
calculations of PROFI rather difficult, and may lead to the 
appearance or illusion of outcome domination (as noted above.) 
This examination of return-on-investment curves for different 
projects immediately presents two possibilities where commitment 
of further financial resources would be rational even in the face 
of negative feedback (such as cost-overruns or revenue-
shortfalls.) First, Type IV curves -- where projects are 
dominated by outcomes -- constitute situations where monetary bad 
news may have no bearing on whether a project should be continued 
or not. When an entire nation is dying from the plague, learning 
that research to find the cure is going to be more costly than 
originally suspected is not rationally tied to the decision of 
whether or not to continue the research. Second, if the 
environment changes during the course of the project, the profit 
line may be lowered in slope. If so, then even if bad news 
lowers the slope of a PROFI line, the slope of the PROFI line may 
nevertheless be higher than the comparison profit line, and 
further commitment of resources to the project would be rational. 
Stages .01A, project. 
The existence of variable PROFI's through the life-cycles of 
projects raises the specter of stages of a project during which 
1 0 
the PROFI is locally increasing, decreasing, or constant, and 
where the PROFI is higher or lower than the EROI for the entire 
project. 	Consider the example delineated in Figure V, where a 
manufacturing firm is designing and producing some new product. 
There are four stages in the life-cycle of the project which may be 
identified: 
Stage A: 	No significant sunk costs have yet accrued. 	Time 
has been spent perhaps on "blue sky" types of research, which may 
be usefully applied to other projects. Personnel have been 
gathered or hired, or even trained in project-nonspecific ways, and 
can be diverted to other projects if this one is terminated. 
Materials may have been purchased or ordered, but not yet utilized 
in a way which prevents their return to the supplier, or again 
diversion to some other project. 
Stage la: 	Costs are being sunk into the project. 	Sunk costs 
are accumulating. Workers are spending time on this particular 
project, or are being trained for aspects of this particular 
project which would not readily transfer to something else. 
Materials have been channeled into this project. But liquidation 
or salvage value is not accruing as fast as costs are being sunk. 
At any point during this stage of the project, the PROFI will be 
increasing, and greater than the EROI for the entire project. 
Stage 	All sunk costs have been sunk, or income is being 
generated faster than further sunk costs are being sunk. 	In the 
manufacturing realm, this might be when production is going full 
swing. The only costs now are the variable variable costs per unit 
produced (such as labor and raw materials.) This is the period of 
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Stage B, the PROFI may be constant during this period if there are 
no economies of scale to be realized during the latter stages of 
production. If there are such economies, the PROFI may continue to 
increase through this stage. In either case, the PROFI will be 
greater than the EROI for the entire project throughout this stage, 
just as it was in Stage B. 
Stage p: 	Sunk costs have been fully recouped. At this point 
a project may be deemed completed and halted, such as in the case 
of a construction project when a building is finished and sold. Of 
PROFI may become constant or continue to increase, depending on 
whether there are additional economies of scale to be realized. In 
the manufacturing realm, this would correspond to that time in a 
project when all start-up costs have been recouped, and the 
production item has become on of the firm's "cash cows." 
Nature DI the negative feedback received 
The nature of the negative feedback received (specifically, 
its magnitude) will interact with the type of return-on-investment 
curve of a project, and with the stage (A,B,C, or D) of the 
project, in determining the rationality of further commitment of 
resources to a partially completed project. It should be noted 
that negative feedback on a project here specifically refers to 
either a realized revenue-shortfall or cost-overrun, hence 
financial negative feedback. 
In the case of a PROFI-inappropriate project negative feedback 
will have one of two effects: as noted earlier, it will either be 
ignored (since PROFI analysis is inappropriate anyway;) or it will 
push the limits of PROFI-inappropriateness, in which case PROFI 
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analysis will become appropriate and the project will become a 
variable or constant PROFI project. 
In the case of constant PROFI projects (such as savings 
accounts,) negative feedback will have the same effect throughout 
the life-cycle of the project. Negative feedback will of course 
lower the PROFI's calculated throughout the project's life-cycle. 
If the PROFI falls below some accepted criterion value (the profit 
line comparison slope, which represents what is available 
elsewhere,) it would be unwise to remain in the project. Recalling 
from Figure II that for a constant PROFI project the PROFI line 
always falls on the comparison profit line, any negative feedback 
would have to lower the slope of a PROFI line at any time in the 
project to a value lower than the comparison profit line value. 
Therefore, for a PROFI constant project, any negative feedback 
constitutes a signal to get out and find another haven for 
investing resources. 
For a variable PROFI project, the rationality of further 
resource commitment in the face of negative financial feedback 
becomes a stage-dependent issue. For simplicity, assume that: 
profit line slope = EROI = 1 + X 
at the start of the project, where X is the profit margin. The 
negative feedback then renders, for the entire project: 
EROI = 1 +X -Y 
where Y is the projected loss on the project (revenue-shortfall or 
cost-overrun.) 
If the project is in Stage A, where no sunk costs have 
accrued, PROFI slopes will be equal to EROI and therefore Y less 
than the comparison profit line value. Therefore, negative 
13 
feedback received at this early stage in the project should lead to 
abandonment or termination of the project. 
When the project has progressed to Stages B or C, the 
rationality of further resource commitment is much more dependent 
upon the magnitude of the negative feedback received, the amount of 
sunk costs sunk into the project, and how these affect PROFI slopes 
relative to the comparison profit line value. Unlike Stage A, the 
slope of PROFI lines will be greater than EROI. During Stage B and 
C, the PROFI slope value (in the absence of negative financial 
feedback) will be given by: 
PROFI = 1 + X + Z 
where Z is the amount by which the PROFI is greater than the EROI, 
in order to recoup any costs sunk into the project. We might think 
of Z as an annualized rate of sunk-cost recovery. If we then add 
negative financial feedback to the picture, the PROFI during Stages 
B and C will be given by: 
PROFI = 1 +X+Z- Y 
Knowing that the profit line slope has the value: 
profit line r. 1 + X 
the PROFI will always be greater than the comparison profit line 
value as long as Z is greater than Y. In other words, the 
projected return on further investment in a partially completed 
project will always be greater than the comparison profit line 
value as long as the annualized sunk cost recovery rate is greater 
in magnitude than the annualized loss value of the negative 
financial feedback received. Consequently, it should be rational 
to commit further resources to a project if the annualized sunk 
14 
cost rate of recovery is greater than the projected loss. 
Interestingly, this will be true even if the project is destined to 
lose money on the whole (over the project's entire life-cycle.) 
The important difference between Stages B and C in this 
analysis has to do with the sinking of sunk costs. As noted 
earlier, Stage B is the period of a project during which sunk costs 
are being sunk. Therefore, Z (the annualized sunk cost rate of 
recovery) must be increasing during this period, in order to 
accommodate the recouping of these increasing sunk costs. This 
increase in the value of Z is in fact what causes PROFI to be 
increasing during Stage B. Once Stage C is reached, where all sunk 
costs have been sunk (or revenue is being generated faster than 
further intentional direct losses are being taken,) Z may become 
relatively constant. This would mean that PROFI would also remain 
relatively constant throughout this period in the project life-
cycle. Any realized economies of scale would increase Z (and 
thereby PROFI) during this period, as they would increase the rate 
at which sunk costs could be recouped. 
Example: A company is in Stage C of a project (all sunk 
costs sunk) when it finds out some bad news. It 
expected X (its profit margin) to be in the 
neighborhood of 25%. However, now the public 
apparently will be willing to pay 27% less than 
expected, for a net loss of (25%-27%)= -2% 
per unit. 	However, at this point in the 
project, the annualized rate of sunk-cost 
recovery is 30%. Should the company terminate 
the project? By our figuring, the PROFI at this 
point in the project life-cycle is given by: 
PROFI = 1 +X+Z- Y 
= 1 + .25 + .30 - .27 = 1.28 
Thus, the projected return on investment for 
commitment of further resources to the project 
is 28%. Since the original intended profit 
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margin was only 25%, it should be rational to 
stay in the project (unless the current accepted 
profit margin is more than 28%.) What if the 
company had received the news during Stage B, 
when (for instance) only half the sunk costs 
had been sunk? The annualized sunk cost rate 
of recovery at that point would have been only 
15%, so that the PROFI at that point would have 
been given by: 
PROFI = 1 +X+Z- Y 
= 1 + .25 + .15 - .27 = 1.13 
In this case, if available alternative 
opportunities offer more than 13% yield, this 
would be a good time to get out of the project. 
The rationality of further commitment of resources in Stage D 
should be analogous to that for Stage C. The only difference is 
that once sunk costs have been recovered, Z becomes part of the 
profit margin for a project, rather than a sunk cost recovery rate. 
Graphically, this PROFI analysis for variable PROFI projects 
is presented in Figures VI and VII. In the case of a revenue-
shortfall (as pictured by the heavy black line in Figure VI,) there 
will be a period during the project (in this case, prior to point 
B') when the slope of a PROFI line will be less than the comparison 
profit line slope. During this period, it will make sense (i.e., 
be financially rational) to terminate the project and divert 
further resources to other available opportunities. However, after 
point B' has been reached in the project life-cycle, the slope of 
the PROFI lines will always be greater than the comparison profit 
line value. Therefore, after this point it will make sense to 
commit further financial resources to the project even though 
overall the project will lose money. 
The analysis is the same for a cost-overrun, as shown in 
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it will make sense to continue to commit resources to a project 
even though overall the project is destined to lose money. After 
point C', PROFI will always be greater than the comparison profit 
line slope. Thus, finishing the project is rational financially 
because after C' revenue will be generated at a rate faster for 
every additional dollar committed, than in another available 
opportunity. 
These points C' (for cost-overruns) and 8' (for revenue-
shortfalls) represent points of "no return" in the completion of a 
project. After a certain amount of money has been committed to a 
project (sunk in,) it will be financially rational to continue to 
commit resources to the project gym 2ugh the project will lose 
money overall. 
Several quick heuristics about further resource commitment can 
be derived for variable PROFI projects. All other things being 
equal: 
(i)further resource commitment is more likely to be rational 
as more sunk costs are sunk. This is simply because Z will 
continue to increase as more sunk costs are sunk, and 
therefore PROFI will also continue to increase as more sunk 
costs are sunk. 	As PROFI increases, further commitment of 
resources will be more rational financially. 
(ii)further resource commitment is more likely to be 
rational as sunk costs constitute an increasingly larger 
proportion of a project's total budget. This is simply 
because Z must be proportionately larger as the sunk 
costs become a larger proportion of the total project 
budget. Only in this way can sunk costs ever hope to be 
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recouped. And, again as Z becomes larger, PROFI will also 
become larger, and it will become financially more 
rational to stay in even in the face of negative feedback. 
Evaluation _of the allocator  
A final consideration lies in how the allocator of resources 
is to be evaluated. Here, the potential variability of PROFI for a 
project during the project's life-cycle presents a problem. Even 
if a project is destined to lose money overall, there nevertheless 
(as was shown above) may be stages in the project's life-cycle 
where PROFI for some amount of further resource commitment will be 
greater than the profit line comparison value. In Figure VI, for 
instance, the project is faced with a loss from a revenue-
shortfall. However, anytime in the project life-cycle after point 
B' has been reached, return-on-commitment of further resources will 
be greater than the profit line comparison value. Therefore, if 
the resource allocator can get the project to point B' in the 
project life-cycle, his performance (in terms of return on 
resources committed) will look extremely good for the remainder of 
the project. This, of course, will not be a function of the 
allocator's behavior at all, but a matter of the magnitude of Z 
after this point of "no return" in the project's life-cycle. If 
the allocator can then focus evaluation of his performance on the 
period during the project life-cycle when PROFI is greater than the 
profit line comparison value, the allocator can look good even 
though the project will be losing money overall. This may lead the 
allocator to commit further resources to reach the point of "no 
return" in the project life-cycle, in order to get the project to a 
18 
point where the allocator is bound to look good for the remainder 
of the project. Notice that in this case, what is rational for the 
project may not be rational for the allocator. If the allocator 
wants to reach a point in the project life-cycle where he or she 
can look good by having a PROFI that is greater than the profit 
line comparison value, it may involve committing further resources 
at a point in the project when PROFI is less than the profit line 
comparison value. 
Conclusions  
This paper has focussed primarily on attacking the notion that 
classic sunk cost problems constitute a unitary phenomenon. Of 
importance to our understanding of sunk cost problems are the ideas 
that: 
-- there are different types of return-on-investment curves 
for different types of projects, and 
-- there are different return-on-investment stages for 
different return-on-investment curves. 
These distinctions take on some importance in view of recent 
findings (e.g., Conlon & Wolf, 1980) that calculation strategies 
may play a role in mediating the psychological impact of sunk costs 
on financial decision-making. This paper suggests that calculation 
strategies may be more appropriate for some return-on-investment 
curves than others. Further, at different stages in a project's 
life-cycle, calculation strategies may produce quite different 
recommendations for further resource commitment, even in the face 
of the same magnitude of negative financial feedback. 
Because these ideas have not previously received any attention 
19 
in the literature on financial decision-making, they provide some 
interesting possibilities for reinterpreting the impact of sunk 
costs. 	Rather than sunk costs per _se having any impact on 
decision-making, commitment to a project may systematically 
influence: (a) an individual's perception of where in the project 
life-cycle a project is -- a psychologically committed person may 
be more likely to perceive a project to be in advanced Stage B or 
Stage C, where PROFI would be sufficiently greater than the profit 
line comparison value to rationally justify further resource 
commitment. 	This might explain the findings of the "A & S 
Financial Decision Case" research, e.g., Staw, 1976; (b) an 
individual's perceptions of what type of return-on-investment curve 
applies to a particular project -- a psychologically committed 
individual may be more likely to perceive a project to be of Type 
IV, and hence invulnerable to negative feedback effects, than if 
not psychologically committed. This might explain some of the 
findings from the "World Bank Problem" research, e.g., Staw & Ross, 
1978. 
The upshot of these insights is that the impact of sunk costs 
may not be related to sunk costs at all. Rather, psychological 
commitment to a project (perhaps through felt responsibility for 
its initiation, as commitment is usually operationalized) may bias 
'Perceptions of what we have shown as a very complex economic 
reality. The biased perception of economic reality might then 
influence decisions about further resource commitment. The 
economic reality would then play only a supporting role in 
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The objective of this project was to findout how managers perceived and 
dealt with sunk costs in the field. The results found that the decision to 
persist in a project was seen from three perspectives: 1) The economic model 
used to decide whether to get into the project in the first place, 2) the 
nature of the setback and the uncertainty it generates, and 3) a set of 
external factors having to do with psychology, sociology, and politics that 
are not evaluated in terms of dollars. All three of these perspectives play 
a role in the field. The relative importance and magnitude of their effects 
remains for future research. 
Multiple methods and studies were used in this project. First, the 
researchers carried on focused interviews with small groups of executives in 
major corporations (Conlon and Wolf). These interviews discussed a sunk 
cost problem selected by the firm. Secondly, a theoretical paper was 
written on the economics of sunk costs, showing that if a project makes 
sense economically at the beginning of the project, the further into the 
project a setback occurs, the larger the setback that can be suffered and 
still have it make economic sense for the project to continue (Northcraft 
and Wolf). Thirdly, several laboratory studies were run to look at the 
interactions of externalities and nature of setbacks with economics of the 
project (Leatherwood and Conlon; Northcraft and Gleeson). Last, a survey 
was designed based on the previoUs results to assess the economics, setbacks 
1 
-.the University of Iowa and the University of Arizona, respectively. The 
benefits of these moves to the project included the involvment of PhD 
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and externalities found in the field (Wolf and Conlon). 
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- , students Marya Leatherwood and Bill Gleeson in the research. Also, there 
has been the involvment of junior faculty at Arizona of Greg Northcraft and 
Joel Brockner, and at Iowa of Peter Carnival and Bruce McCain as 
intellectual colleagues who may have effects on furture research. 
The following bibliography lists five papers produced from the project. 
All have been or will be presented at professional meetings. One paper has 
been published in an important journal, two are under review, and two more 
are being revised for publication. 
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Abstract  
• 	• 	• • • 	• 	••• a • 
This paper explores how we might know whether the decision to cut 
off a losing enterprisels clouded by what already has been invested in 
the venture. A new model is proposed — the Life-Cycle Model. The Life- . 
Cycle Model borrows an accounting measure (the Time-Adjusted Rate-of-
Return) to describe the effect of "sunk costs" on the expected rate of 
• • •• •••• 	•• 	 • • • 	 •ft 	• 	a • 	• ••• 	 • 	 ••• • • • •••• ow • 	• •• ■• ••• • •• ..... ••• • • 
return for future costs in a project.. The Life-Cycle Model proposes two 
dimensions of consideration for resource-allocation decisions: types of 
..... 	
, 	
. . . 	 . . . 	 . 
projects, and stages within projects. The Model is used to examine the 
relevance of negative feedback to the decision to =Tit further resources 
to capletion of a project. It is noted that when a relatively large 
proportion of a project's total costs are taken early in the project, a 
region of rationality is created. The region of rationality is an amount 
of negative feedback which can be absorbed by a project, while maintaining 
the project's original rate of return over the remaining costs for the 
project. The implications of the Model for future research on psychological 
• • • •• 	e• • .• - 	• 
commitment and managerial resource-allocation decisions are discussed. 
Dollars, Sense, and Sunk Costs: 
A Life-Cycle Model of Resource-Allocation Decisions 
The year 1982 began'on a'record tear in business and econcnic circles: 
In the first quarter, more U.S. based companies filed for bankruptcy than 
in any first quarter since the Great Depression of the 1930's. For the 
owners or CEO's of firms in the throws of such economic woes, deciding 
whether to "throw in the towel" could be the most difficult and painful 
choice of a lifetime. However, this type of decision is not an extraor-
dinary circumstance. Even for the most profitable companies, not all 
projects and new ventures meet with success. Cost-overruns, revenue- 
, 
shortfalls, and bads news of other sorts are, unfortunately, all too 
common. Often the decision that needs to be made is when to cut off a 
losing proposition, before it can take the rest of a corporate entity 
down with it. 
But is this an easy decision to make? This paper explores how we 
might assess whether this decision is clouded by what has already been 
invested'(or "sunk') in a venture — both personally and monetarily. 
Consider the. following examples: 
-An investor has all her money in a long-term savings account at 
20% interest. Interest rates change, so that new certificates became 
available at 21%. After same deliberation, the investor decides to keep 
her money in the 20% account. 
-A construction company is building a new subdivision when interest 
rates go sky high and the bottom falls out of the housing market. Despite 
facing certain losses in doing so, the company decides to finish building 
the subdivision. 
- A secretary is calling an airline to make plane reservations for 
his boss Be knows he can expect to wait at least four or five minutes, 
and often ten, before getting through. But today he has already waited 
fifteen minutes. Be decides to keep waiting. 
The city council:of a major metropolitan area decides to go ahead 
with a slum renewal project. The project will provide new low-cost 
housing for low-income residents of the area, while lowering crime rates, 
and generally improving the quality of life in a substantial portion of 
the city's old downtown area. Halfway through the project, it becomes 
clear that costs for the project have been underestimated by almost 40%. 
The city council decides to finish to project, as planried, anyway. 
These examples all share one central theme. An initial decision to 
invest time or money in some venture has met with negative feedback —
the expected "best possible" outcome has not been realized. Nevertheless, 
the decision-maker has opted to continue in the course of the initial 
decision. In =mon parlance, this smacks of "throwing good money after 
bad.' Worse yet, this scenario does not appear to be at all uncommon 
. (e.g., Staw, 1981). Why should such seemingly irrational behavior occur? 
This paper will present a framework — the Life-Cycle Model of 
investment decisions which begins to answer this question. 
These examples are all instances of "sunk costs situations a 
decision has been made and resources irretrievably expended following 
from that decision. From a traditional accounting or financial analyst 
perspective, decision-makers throw good money after bad in sunk cost 
situations because of confusion. The decision-maker fails to understand 
that money already spent should not have any bearing on decisions to 
*.-commit further resources to a project in the future. If the decision-maker 
is interested in maximizing returns-on-inveStment e . the path to the best 
return lies in allocating resources to whatever available investment • 
I 
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' alternative promises the best ratio of future revenues to future costs, 
even if it means abandoning a project that is a success in comparison to 
prior expectations. The best return on future allocation of resources 
is what counts, and th4past therefore cannot possibly be relevant 
Worngren, 1982). 
The psycholcgist brings a different perspective to bear in under-
standing why a decision-maker might throw good money after bad. The 
psychologist claims to be less interested in how investment decisions 
should be nade, and more interested in how they axe made. The 
psychologist says .a decision-maker faced with negative feedback about a 
. project's financial progress, may feel the need to reaffirm the wisdom of 
time and money already sunk into a project: Further commitment of 
resources in the face of negative feedback somehow 'justifies' the initial 
decision (Staw, 1976), or at least provides further opportunities for it 
to be proven correct. The decision-maker may also treat the negative 
feedback as simply a learning experience — a cue to redirect efforts 
'within a project, rattier than abandon it (Connolly, 1976). Or perhaps 
the decision-maker will rationalize away the negative feedback as a whim 
of the environment -- a storm to be weathered, rather than a message to be 
heeded. In any case, the psychologist's conclusion is the same: whether 
it should or not, a project's financial past plays a role in future 
decisions. Quite simply, sinking resources into a project fosters a kind 
of psychological momentum or inertia that negative feedback may be 
powerless to halt. 
For the practicing manager, throwing good money after bad is the 
aftermath of a particularly puzzling dilemma: when to get out of a losing 
situation one has already sunk time and money into, versus when to 
.persevere to overcome adversity. In fact, the manager is often caught 
between acknowledging the wisdom of the accountant's prescription, and 
living out the psychologist's inertia. As the accountant suggests, the 
manager wants to get the'best possible return on allocation of his 
resources. But as the psychologist suspects, the manager feels committed 
CT entrapped. Be feels that money already sunk into a venture somehow 
counts* in making decisions. 
Mot Are Sunk Costs? 
Stink costs arise not in a single choice and outcome situation, but 
in projects, where there are streams over time of anticipated costs 
and revenues. In a project, funds are expended incrementally and precede. 
revenues. A plan or budget for a project details the disbursement of 
• 
costs for the project over time, and the projected revenues. Often, 
there will be a period in the budget when costs exceed revenues, in anti- • 
cipation of subsequent periods in the budget when revenues will exceed 
costs. Sunk costs are this negative cashflow experienced in anticipation 
of future compensating positive cashflow. Without flows of revenues and 
costs, one cannot have sunk costs. • If costs and revenues occur in a 
single decision • or time period, there can be no sunk costs. Sunk costs 
are of interest after a project has started, and the point in the budget 
reached where costs spent exceed revenues realized. Now the manager needs 
to decide whether to continue and finish the project. What might be 
considered at this juncture? 	• 
— Are the experienced revenue and cost streams following the plan? 
If there are large costs early in the project, thereturn-o4 ," 
investment for costs taken to this point in the project may be 
less than what is expected for the project as a whole. But is it 
less than planned? Without a budget, this would be impossible 
to know, and meaningless to ask. 
• 
- What is the projected return-on-investment for the remaining costs 
of the project? Bow does it compare with the return-on-investment 
rates offered by other current investment alternatives? 
• • 
• If news is received that a departure from the budget (a cost-
overrun or revenue-shortfall) is imminent, how much of either is 
•acceptable? Dods it matter when this departure from the budget 
.occurs? And finally, which is preferable: cost-overruns or 
revenue-shortfalls? 
A 
Without the necessity of further resource commitments, there seems 
• 
little for the manager to decide. Why exit a project when it promises 
only future revenues at no additional costs? In that event, decreased 
future revenues are annoying, but don't present any decision for the 
maniger. The problem occurs when there are sunk costs, required future 
costs, and a departure from the budget is anticipated. In that event, 
the manager needs to understand the relationship between pest and future 
costs, and future revenues. 
In the traditional "sunk costs" situation, recovery through use seems 
to be an appealing notion. When a piece of machinery is purchased for a 
project, the machinery is expected to "produce" revenue during its 
productive life, for instance by turning raw materials into marketable 
finished goods. Faced with negative feedback 	certain loss through 
cost-overrun or revenue-shortfall,) the manager may wish to continue a 
project to its natural (albeit costly) conclusion, whereby recovery through 
use would be . maximized and loss through sunk costs minimized. 
this strategy is rather attractive, and may underlie the manager's feeling • 
that the accountant is not capturing the whole picture in his prescriptions. 
'to ignore sunk costs invoking investment decisions. For the accountant, 
the decision to continue is simply a matter of the ratio of future revenues 
to -future costs; "recovery through use muddies the waters of the decision. 
Psychologists have tended to leave "negative feedback' ill-defined in 
their experimental examinations of sunk cost situations. The information 
provided is rarely sufficient to complete future-revenues-to-future-costs 
calculations (such as Net Present Value or Time Adjusted Rate-of-Return). 
This reflects the psychologist's claim that the "correctness" of further 
resource allocation is not an issue. The psychologist is interested only 
. 	 : 
in whether the existence of "sunk costs* influences psychological commit -  
•ment (as revealed by further resource commitment) in : the face of negative 
financial feedback. 
:Yet, this rendering of the psychologist's position seems misleading. 
What makes further allocation of resources to a project in the face of 
negative feedback indicative of psychological commitment to the psycholo-
gist clearly rust be the apparent irrationality of the resource-allocation 
-decision. In cases where'it is economically advisable to allocate 
further resources despite negative feedback, any psychological causal 
mechanism volunteered by the psychologist is superfluous -- a simple 
economic explanation would be equally predictive and more parsironious. 
This is not to suggest that a manager cannot feel psychologically ccamit- 
% 
ted to a project when the project is successful. Rather, the notion of 
• gm • 	•• • 	• • 	• 
commitment under such circumstances may add little or nothing to our 
. 	 • 	. • 	• . 	.. • • •• 
understanding of behavior. Therefore, any hope the psychologist holds of 
shedding light on "sunk cost" decision-making must come from examining 
• • 
situations where the accountant would maintain that "good money is being 
thrown after bad.* 
Unfortunately, previous "sunk cost" research by psychologists has 
• not examined decision-making situations in which commitment of further . 
resources is explicitly economically inadvisable.' Instead, psychological 
researchers have examined decisions in which sunk costs and negative 
financial feedback are explicit, but the revenue picture is not (e.g., 
Staw & Ross. 1978). The economic rationality of further resource commit-
ment is left indeterminable for the decision-maker. In some cases (e.g., 
Brockner, Shaw, and Rabin, 1979), the expected rate-of-return for further 
financial commitment even can be shown with a few assurptions to be 
increasing and (after a certain amount of investment) financially advisable, 
despite the claim that further resource cormitrent under the circumstances 
. is psychologically rather than economirary motivated. 
Altogether, it is not clear that psychologists have examined invest-
ment decisions where further commitment of resources amounts to "throwing 
good money after bad.• Yet, only through examining decisions in situations 
where further resource commitment is demonstrably irrational can the 
psychologist hope to add to. the explanatory power of economic accounts of 
-resource-allocation decision-making. 
TARR: A Tool for Assessing Investment Rationality 
Return-on-investment decisions have three dimensions: expenses, 
revenues, and tire. Time enters the picture in terms of the opportunity 
costs of committing capital. For instance, one would expect $5000 "sunk" 
into a project for two years to yield a greater return than the same amount 
cormitted for one year. The second year of being "sunk' represents fore- 
going 
 
other investment opportunities which would yield additional earnings. 
Accountants and economists have often assumed that managers are 
interested in the time dimensions only in so far as it influences cost 
and revenue calculations, since profit is the goal of resource-allocation 
decisions, and profit is a function of revenue-to-cost ratios. Conse-
quently, accountants have developed such discounting procedures as the 
Tire-Adjusted Rate-of-Return to encorporate time in the evaluation of 
costs and revenues for investment opportunities. The Tine-Adjusted Rate 
of Return (or TARR) is derived by adjusting the actual costs and revenues 
written into a budget to reflect the time value of money, and then calcu- 
•lating a rate of return-on-investment for all costs and revenues discounted 
to the present. The resulting rate of return is the effective yield of a 
project, or the interest rate for borrowing money at which the project 
would exactly break even. 1 (This measure is also known as the Internal 
Rate of Return.) 
It would be foolish to dispute the usefullness of procedures like 
TARR for objectively assessing the advisability of an investment oppor-
tunity. As a convent on how decision should be made, the TARR 
represents an important point of departure for assessing how they are 
made. This paper will develop a richer framework of investment decisions 
— the Life-Cycle Model — into which the accountant's prescription for 
handling sunk-cost situations can be explored. 
The Life-Cycle Model has two _dimensions: types of decisions, and 
stages within decisions. The Life-Cycle Model follows the lead of the 
Time-Adjusted Rate-of-Return in encorporating time as a consideration. 
The Life-Cycle Model uses the TARR to examine successive resource-conraitrrent 
decisions over the life of a project. Previous researchers (e.g., 
Terborgh, 1958) have, of course, examined and discussed the interplay and 
influence of different facets of resource-allocation decisions. Hackney 
- (1965), for instance, modelled changes in overall return rates for a 
project, over the life of the project, as influenced by such factors as 
cost over- and under-runs. However, the Life-Cycle Model provides two 
.important benefits over previous work in this area. : First, it allows a 
clear specification of when a financial setback is likely to constitute 
a rational reason to terminate or abandon a project. For future psycho-
logical research, this will provide a true baseline from which to explore 
more precisely than previously when and why people really do throw good 
mone' after bad. More to the point, the Life-Cycle Model clearly reveals 
• the psychologist's fallacy: continuing a project in the face of a finan-
cial setback is not always irrational (it depends upon the stage in the 
project, and the magnitude of the financial setback). Second, the Life-
Cycle Model provides an insight into the manager's preoccupation with a 
project's financial past. The Life-Cycle Model demonstrates how a 
project's financial past can be used heuristically to understand the 
project's future. 
Project Life-Cycles 
The following discussion of the Life-Cycle Model considers four types 
of project life-cycles, corresponding to the four examples with which 
this paper began. These four types are derived from examining the changes 
. 	 - Al 
'in the TARR. for the allocation of further resources to a project, 
throughout the courses of different projects. (To be fully accurate, rate 
of return figures should encorporate dollar value estimates for corporate 
image cultivation, infltience on reputation, and other "intangible' costs 
and revenues, as well as some adjustment for appreciation Or increased 
liquidation value of a project.) The projected TARR for a project is of 
interest precisely because this is'one measure recommended accountants, 
by which to judge whether resources should be cornitted to a project. 
For instance, if competing investment opportunities offer a TARR of 20%, 
a TARR of 21% for commitment of further resources to a partially-completed 
-project would be worth putting money into; a TARR of : 19% would not. 
Anytine the TARR for a project is less than'what is available from 
•competing investment alternatives, commitment of resources would be 
financially inadvisable. 
Typically, the Tire-Adjusted Rate-of-Return might be used to choose 
among competing investment opportunities before any of the opportunities 
•bave been invested in. In practice, the Time-Adjusted Rate-of-Return 
would be one of several' measures used; any one measure a
▪ 
lone has limita- 
tions. For instance, TARR compares return rates, rather than total 
• dollars returned. TARR therefore may be misleading if comparing two 
investment opportunities with cost streams that are quite different in 
magnitude. The following discussion draws on TARR because of its 
intuitive appeal— similar measures (such as Net Present Value) would 
lead to the same conclusions. 
TARR calculations can also be used to decide whether to continue a 
• 
project which has incurred a financial setback. Negative financial 
feedback (either cost-overrun or revenue-shortfall) will diminish a 
project's overall projected rate of return. This is irrelevant 
financially, though it could well make a difference to a manager. What 
matters financially, as the accountant will be quick to note, is the rate 
of return (as measured by TARR.- for instance) for remaining resource 
commitments required by a project. TARR calculations can be used to 
assess whether this rate of return for remaining costs is better than 
ccatpeting investment alternatives (either new or partially coapleted.) 
insert Table 1 about here • 
Table 1 presents four different types of sample project budgets. Each 
sample budget is represented by a five-year cost stream, and a five-year 
revenue stream. The format for presenting cost and revenue streams is 
taken from Horngren (1982); to simplify the examples, costs are assumed 
. to be taken at the beginning of each year, and revenues realized at the 
end of each year. For each of the sample project budgets presented, the 
. . 
Tine-Adjusted Rate of Return for remaining expenditures in the project 
is also shown both for the beginning of the project, and at the end of 
Year 4. This highlights the changes in TARR values over the course a 
project budget, as influenced by different cost and revenue streams, and 
leads to four types of rate-of-return life-cycles: 
2122e. ,11. Project A in Table 1 shows a project budget in which TARR 
is constant (at 20% return) throughout the entire life-cycle of the 
project. The investor mentioned at the beginning of the paper, with her 
money in a long-term savings account, provides an example of a Type 1 
. rate-of-return life-cycle. Notice that there are no sunk costs in such 
an investment opportunity. At no point would halting the "project' 
• 
occasion a financial loss for the investor. Also notice that the TARR 
for such a project is always the same at all points in the project's 
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life-cycle. 
ppntinuous variable  TIZ Projects B and C in Table 1 Typa  
show project budgets in which the TAR11 for remaining expenditures varies 
over the life-cycle of the project. trecifically, there are costs at the 
beginning of the projects (these may ft,e start-up costs or equipment 
. 	. 	• 	- 
expenditures) which are not expected to generate immediate revenue These 
are sunk costs in the traditional seize. The construction company 
 building a subdivision provides an !)at-ple of this, where materials and 
machines must be purchased, designs ckiwn up, and workers trained, before 
any income is realized. Because revetes are not accruing when these 
• . 
costs are realized (or perhaps, reverAs are not being generated at the 
rate of expenditures,)the TARR must greater after these costs 
• 
than before, in order that total revtaesexceed total costs for the 
entire project. Only if the TARR ins es  after costs that don't 
generate immediate revenue have been ,j 37ed  can the rate of return for  
the entire project reach the rate Pred at the project's inception. 
Project C in Table 1 illustratespoint. A substantial propor- 
tion of the project's total costs .  ($"41).0) are taken early in the project, 
etirou while revenues are evenly distribut 	ghout. Consequently, while  
the rate of return for the entire pry i s only 20%, by the beginning  
•reltilig: expenditures ($245 in Year of Year 4 the rate of return for 
. • 
4 and $220 in Year 5) is -31-6%. 
. 	• 
discontinuous  /TIT.  yar.12,44=6„ Project D in Table 1 shows Mirpt  
a special case of the continuous vary  TARR life-cycle, where virtually 
no revenue accrues, until the very (* if the  project life-cycle, at which 
point all benefits accrue. Examplestthis would include the building 
of a bridge, or waiting *on hold" onS telephone to make airplane 
reservations. 
Table 1 
Four Sample Project Budgets 
TIME 
Project A  . 	Pro  sii B 111:01511C 
Costs 	Revenues 
 Proiect D 
Costs 	'Revenues .Costs 	Revenues Costs Revenues 
Tear 1 $ 	853 • 	$ 1000 $ 1200 $ 1000 $ 2300 $ 1000 $ 1540 0 
Tear 2 833 .1000 800 1000 300' 1000 200 0 
Year 3 • 833 1000 720 1000 270 1000 180 0 
Tear 4 833 	• 1000 450 1000 ' 	245 1000 150 0 
Year 5 833 	• 1000 590 1000 220 . 1000 120 $ 5000 
Time—Adjusted Rate of Return 
(for remaining expenditures) 
at Year 1 20% 20% 20% 20% 
at Year 5 20% 70% 355% 4067% 
One can imagine a family of curves of Type II, ranging from Type I 
to Type III, depending upon (i) the proportion of costs (corpared to the 
total budget for the project) realized before revenues begin accruing 
faster than costs, and . (ii) the ratio of revenues to costs when revenues 
• • 	• •• • 	 • . . 
are accruing faster than costs. It bears mentioning that TARR values 
might meander up and down through the life-cycle of a project. For 
Instance, in building. missiles, sore assembled components might counand 
a healthy profit for the maker. However, once fitted and installed in 
the missile, they become effectively valueless until the entire missile 
is completed, at which point an even healthier profit is realized. Rate 
of return thus reaches a potential local maximum once when components are 
completed but not yet physically aconmitted" to final assembly, and then 
reaches yet a higher maximum again when the missile is completely assembled. 
In terms of TARR analysis, this means that it might make sense to commit . 
• • 	• 
score amount of resources to partial completion of a project which gets 
the project to a local maximum in the project's life-cycle, without 
caranitting enough resources to complete the project. (This should become 
... • 	. 
apparent later, when the impact of negative financial feedback on TARR 
calculations for renaining expenditures is discussed in further detail.) 
Zpa 	ERR-inappropriate projects. The life-cycle for this 
type of project may look like any member of the Type II family, except 
that for this type of project, TARR calculations are inappropriate. There 
.... 	• . 
might be two reasons for this. First, some projects are undertaken not 
because they are cost-effective, but because they are effective. Period. 
For example, TARR calculations may be unnecessary.to understanding the 
. 	• 
funding of a war, or research on some acute disease crisis, or the slum 
renewal project noted earliei. Statements like, "HAM the expense,' or 
16.W.7.60. 	AD 
• 
*Whatever it costs, it's worth it,* are traditionally associated with 
• 
such projects, whether accurately or not. Another way of saying this is 
to note that decisions concerning'such projects appear to be dominated by 
outcomes. It may be worth just about anything to avoid losing a war if 
it :ream being sold into slavery. There are limits to this perspective, 
of course. It is not thought to be worth selling oneself into slavery to 
one group to gain their protection from another. But within limits, the 
apparent extreme value of anticipated revenues makes formal TARR calcu-
lations unnecessary. 
A second possibility for the inappropriateness of TARR calculations 
arises when the benefits of a project are not easily specificable, or not 
easily quantifiable. This would render the calculations of TARR difficult, 
and may lead to the appearance or illusion that the outcome picture renders 
TAREtcalculations unnecessary, as noted above. Behaviorally, a manager may 
even prefer to keep the outcome picture arbiguous so that his or her 
performance cannot so easily be monitored or evaluated. 
• This examination of TARR values over the course of different projects 
irmediately presents two possibilities where commitment of further finan-
cial resources would be rational even in the face of negative feedback 
•(such as cost-overruns or revenue-short-falls). First, Type Iv life-
cycles (where projects are dominated by outcomes) constitute situations 
where financial negative feedback may have no bearing on whether a 
▪ project should be continued or not. When an entire nation is dying from 
• the plague, learning that research to find the cure is going to be more 
costly than originally projected does not render continuation of the 
.research economically inadvisable. On the other hand, ranagers interested 
in pibtecting their turf may find this reasoning a convenient smokescreen 
behind which to hide their failures. Second, if the environment changes . 
during the course - of a project, the'relevant comparison value for TARR 
may change. If so t even if a financial setback decreases TARR, the TARR . 
 for the remainder of the. project neverthelessmay exceed the rate-of-
return offered by competing investment opportunities, so that further 
corrnitzrent of resources to the project would be economically advisable. 
Note that either of these points could hold even if the financial setback 
were encountered at the beginning of a project, even before any money bad 
beenJspent. 
•••■• 	• • •• 	••• 	45. 	•• 	•• ■• 
• Stages of a Project. 
The existence of variable TARR's through the life-cycle of projects 
raises the specter of stages of a project during which the TARR for the 
remainder of the project is increasing, decreasing, or constant, and 
where the TARR is greater or less than the return rate projected for the 
entire project before the project was begun. There are four stages in 
the life-cycle of a project: 
stage 	No significant sunk costs have yet accrued. Time has 
been spent perhaps on -"blue sky" types of research, which maybe usefully 
• • 	. • 	..... • • . 
applied to other projects. Personnel have been gathered or hired, or even 
trained in project-nonspecific ways, and can be diverted to other projects 
' if this one is terminated.. Materials may have been purchased or ordered, 
but not yet utilized in a way which prevents their return to the supplier, 
or diversion to some other project. 
•--• 	- 	- - • - 
• stage EL Costs are being realized faster than revenues are 
• •• •• • • 
accruing. Workers are spending time on this particular project, or are 
• being trained for aspects of this particular project which would not 
readily transfer to something else. Materials have been channeled into 
this project. But revenues are not accruing as fast as costs are being 
realized. At any point during this stage of the project, the TARR for the 
remainder of the project will be increasing, and greater than the return 
rate projected for the entire project before it began.' 
stage ga. Revenues are being realized faster than further costs. In 
the manufacturing realm, this might be when production is going full swing. 
The only costs now are the variable costs per unit produced (such as labor 
and raw materials). In the traditional view, this is the period of the 
project life-cycle when sunk costs are being recovered. Unlike Stage B, 
the TARR for the remainder of the project may be constant during this 
period if there are no economies of scale to be realized during the latter 
stages Of production. If there are such economies, the TARR may continue 
to increase (as it does for Projects B and C in Table 1) through this 
stage. In either case, the TARR for the remainder of the project will be 
greater throughout this stage than the return rate originally projected 
for the entire project, just as it was in Stage B. 
Stage  IN. Revenues for the entire project now exceed total costs. 
. . 	. 
At this point, a project may be deemed completed and halted, such as in 
the case of a construction project when a building is finished and sold. 
Or TARR may become constant or continue to increase, depending on whether 
a 	•• • • 	• 	• 	a 	e• 	a 	woe. 	...... 	4. 	• 	 • 	• 	• • 	• • • • ma • 	• 	•• 
there are additional economies to be realized. In the manufacturing realm, 
this would correspond to that tine in a project whet: all start-up costs 
have been recovered, .and the production . item has become one of the firm's 
." 	• 
acash cows.' 
APPLICATION: The Impact' of Negative Feedback 
	
•••• • ft • 	. • 	• . . 	... . • • 	..... ••• 	 • 	• • 
Negative financial feedback to a project can be of two kinds; cost-
pverruns or revenue-shortfalls. Cost-overruns and revenue-shortfalls 
. 	• • 	 • 
occur as discrepancies between experienced costs and revenues, and the 
costs and revenues planned in the budget for a project. Negative feedback 
. 	 . 	. 
•can occur for any of the four types of projects. However, the variable-
TARR projects (ripes II and III) have different stages, and negative 
feedback will have a range of different implications for decision- 
. 
inking, depending upon the stage in the project during which the feedback 
is received. The limits of this range of implications arp found in the 
Type I and Type IV projects. 
In the case of Type I (constant TARR) projects, negative feedback 
has the same effect throughout the life-cycle of the project. Negative 
feedback lowers the calculated ThTR's. If the TARR falls below the 
• ••T 
acceptable criterion value (which represents what is available elsewhere), 
it would be irrational to stay in the project and unlikely that a manager 
would stay unless the manager was inattentive, or the cost of changing 
was great (as with savings certificates that require "substantial 
penalties for early-withdrawl.") In the other most extreme case, Type 
IV projects, TARR. analysis is inappropriate because one would finish the 
project regardless of feedback. Negative financial feedback could have 
an impact on decision-making for a Type IV project if the feedback caused 
. 	 . • • 	• 	. . 	• 
the manager to reconceive the project as a Type II or III project. 
The Type II (variabaeTARI) project begins (Stage A) as if it is a 
Type I project. In subsequent stages, costs flow out faster than reve-
nues flow in. (If revenues are all deferred to the end of the project, 
the project is a Type III project.) TO determine the magnitude of 
negative feedback that can be absorbed in a variable-TARR project, an 
analysis crossed four levels of tow early in a project costs are spent 
against four levels of how late the revenues are realized. The four cost 
leveli were: (1) all costs at tbeieginning of the project, (2) most 
costs early, (3) costs almost evenly distributed over time, and (4) costs 
evenly distributed over time. The four levels of revenues were: (1) 
• 
revenues evenly distributed over time, (2) revenues distributed almost 
evenly but with slightly more at the end of the project, (3) revenues 
skewed strongly toward the end of the project, and finally (4) all the 
-revenues realized at the end of the project. 
insert Table 2 about here 
•• 	••• 	 ••• 
Table 2 reports the results of the analysis, showing the magnitude 
of negative feedback that can be absorbed by a project, if the project is 
to yield a 20% time adjusted rate-of-return for the remaining costs in -
the project. In Table 2, the magnitude of negative tfeedback which could 
be absorbed is expressed as a factor — the maximm ► number by which 
subsequent costs could be multiplied, or subsequent revenues divided, and 
the 20% TARR maintained for the remaindei of the project. (For example, 
In cell 2 of row 2 of Table 2, if at the beginning of year 3 all subse- 
. 
quent costs were multiplied by 4.11, or all subsequent revenues divided 
by 4.11, the project would still have a 20% TARR for remaining costs 
taken in the project.) This factor is shown for all combinations of the 
• 
four types of cost streams and four types of revenue streams, at the 
,beginning of each year of the project budget. 
This analysis shows that if there is a period in a project's budget 
(Stage B) in which costs are to be taken faster than revenues are•to be 
realiTed i it will be possible during subsequent periods for the project 
to absorb negative feedback and still obtain its initial intended•return- 
•orr-investment for the remaining costs taken in the project. We might 
. 	. 
call the allowable discrepancy between intended and realized costs 
•• • 	 • 	•• 
and revenues post-Stage-8 in a project the region of rationality for the 
project. This region of rationality bounds the magnitude of negative 
- Table 2. 

































All Up Front . • 
$ 2988 
1 833 924 1014 1155 
:1 833  1021 . 	. 	1234 	. 1704 
1 833 1125 : 1501 2819 
1 833 1229 1812 6201 
Mostly Up  
Front  
$ 2306 
300 3.15 3.49 3.83 4.36 
270 3.36 4.11 . 	4.97 . 6.87 
245 3.57 4.81 6.42 12.06 
220 3.79 5.59 8.24 28.19 
Somewhat • 
17p Front  
. . 
$ 1164 . • 
800 1.18 1.31 1.44 1.64 
720 1.26 1.54 1.87 '2.58 
650 1.33 1.81 2.41 4.53 
590 1.41 2.08 .3.07 10.51 
Constant - ' 
(Type I) 
833 
.$ 	833  
1.00 1.11 1.22. 1.39 
- 	833 1.00 1.22 1.48 2.04 
833 1.00 1.35 1.80 3.38 
833 1.00 1.48 1 2.18 7.44 
*All costs, revenues, and TARR factors are shown for a 5-year project 
life-cycle, as in Figure 1. TARR factors are the numbers by 
which remaining costs could be multiplied or remaining revenues 
divided, while maintaining a TARR of 20Z for the remainder of the project. 
pull& 60SZS - LU 
feedback which rationally can be absorbed if a project is to continue. 
The contents of Table 2 demonstrate that.the later in a project revenues 
• 
are realized, or the earlier' in a project costs are taken, the larger 
will be this region of rationality in the later stages of the project. 
The region of rationality is non-existent with a Type I project, increasing 
in size from Type II through Type III projects (as anticipated revenues 
are realized later in a project), and largest in Type IV projects (where 
virtually any negative feedback can be rationally absorbed). 
This analysis shows the conditions under which it is quite rational 
to throw good money after bad: the more a manager has invested in a 
project early on, or the larger and later the payoffs, the wiser it is to 
stay in a project. Thus, the Life-Cycle Model suggests that it should 
not be surprising that in many cases managers persist in a course of 
action even in the face of negative feedback. Mat may need explanation 
is why a manager might not persist, when his or her project is well 
within the region of rationality? The answer may lie in the manager's 
framing of a project as a whole — a series of investments which began 
in the past, rather than a series of remaining investments which begin 
now. It may be rational to finish a project even in the face of substan- 
.. 
tial negative feedback. However, in evaluating a manager, it may also 
be reasonable for the organization to hold the manager accountable for 
the total project, which would return a loss.. Finishing the project 
efficiently may not offset the project's overall sub-par performance, and 
may imply that the manager is ignoring or unaware of the project's 
shortcomings. 
•• •••.. 	• • m• 	• • 
This trade-off can lead to an interesting dilemma for the manager. 
Even if a project is destined *to lose *money overall, there may be a point 
Sunk Costs — 21 
a • 
in the project's life-cycle after which the TARR for further funding will 
be greater than what is offered by competing investment opportunities. 
Therefore, if the manager can get the project to that point in the 
project's life-cycle, his or her performance will look extremely good for 
the remainder of the project. This may lead the manager to camiit further 
resources, in order to get a project to the point where the manager is 
bound to look good for the balance of the project. What is irrational 
for the organization may be rational for the manager. This would happen 
if the organization rewards turning a loss into a success, rather than 
bolding the manager accountable for the total project. 
This tradeoff of success over the remainder of a project against 
. 	_ 
failure over the total project raises new opportunities for research on 
project selection. If two projects have the same expected TAZI4 which 
is preferred: one with smaller or larger proportion of costs early in 
the project? A smaller proportion of the costs upfront means it will 
berme likely for a project to be abandoned if negative financial feed- 
. back is encountered, since the region of rationality will be smiler. On 
the other hand, a larger proportion of costs early in the project helps 
insure completion of a project, even in the face of a financial setback, 
. since the region of rationality will be large. Options and strategies of 
this sort may be salient to politicians and managers, but have not yet 
been the subject of systematic investigation. 
The Life-Cycle Model also suggests that further research on cognitive 
biases of decision-makers may add to our understanding of resource-
cormitrent decisions. Specifically, managers may have preferences for 
• • • 	• •••• • 	4. • 	•• 	 • ••• • • 	• 	•• 	.111• • • • 	 a. 	4. 
revenue-shortfal) s over cost-overruns within the region of. rationality; 
revenue-shortfalls may be seen as gains foregone, but cost-overruns felt 
• 
as losses out of pocket. Fahneman and Tversky (1979) have proposed that 
utilities for gains are treated differently than losses; managers are 
risk-averse toward gains, but risk prone toward losses. Further, as 
. 	• . 
noted earlier, managers may have a bias to construe their failures as 
, . . 
Type 11/projects, whereby they can contend that the success or failure of 
the project is beyond any numerical assessment. 
. 	. 
In summary, the Life-Cycle Model suggests two major directions for 
research on resource-:allocation decisions. These two directions corres-
pond to the two types of departures from the Model we might expect to.see 
in resource-allocation decisions. First, the behavior of decision-makers 
may depart from the Model because of involuntary cognitive biases. 
Decision-makers simply may not be able to see the world the way the Model 
suggests that the world should be seen. Second, the behavior of decision-
rakers may depart from the Model because of deliberate indifference to the 
Model's prescriptions. This may occur, for instance, when psychological 
commitment overrides any sense of financial rationality, or when repeated 
receipt of alterations to a project budget cause the decision-maker to 
lose faith in the budget as a reliable input to the decision-making process. 
Both of these directions for research certainly invite the psychologist 
both to expand and clarify his contributions to our understanding of why 
a project manager might commit further resources to a project in the face 
of negative feedback. 
Conclusions: Project Life-Cycles and Resource-Allocation Decisions 
The Life-Cycle Model of resource-allocation decisions provides a 
richer framework in which to view the accountant's presCription that 
resource-cormdtment decisions should be made only by comparing future 
revenues to future costs. The Life-Cycle Model does not dispute the 
accountant's claim. Rather, the Life-Cycle Model notes the heuristic 
value of: 
different tmeacf cost and revenue life-cycles, and 
different stages in cost and revenue life-cycles, 
in arriving at the decision of whether to commit further resources to a 
partially-completed project. 
The Life-Cycle Model is not at all in conflict with the accountant's 
prescription. What the Life-Cycle Model does provide is an understanding 
of what the accountant's *future revenues to future costs" measures (like 
TARI) are likely to be at any point in a business venture, and, perhaps 
more importantly, where (higher or lower) those measures are likely to 
be going. The Life-Cycle Model uses the accountant's prescription to 
capture the systematic predictability of costs-to-revenues measures during 
the course of a business venture. 
The region of rationality established by the Life-Cycle Model serves 
as a baseline from which to pursue new research. Exploration should begin 
on the possibility of.behwiorsgenUinely outside the bounds of rationality. 
There might be personal, organizational, or other non-financial reasons 
for such behaviors, as suggested by previous psychological research on 
commitment. Research also needs to focus on managerial decision-making 
processes and propensities within the region of rationality. Within 
the region of rationality, managers' perceptions of changes in revenues- 
to-costs measures over tire, and in reaction to cost-overruns and revenue-
shortfalls, need to be examined. Further, the behavior of these measures 
reveals (perhaps) a dilemma for the manager in managing a project. Acco-
lades may accrue for turning losses into gains, but punishments may await 
projects that lose money overall. Similarly, while managers may prefer 
revenue-shortfalls after a project is under way, budgets with large 
'up-fronts costs may, be preferred before a project is underway, if the 
manager is committed to seeing the project finished. 
Thus, the Life-Cycle Model -- with its types and stages --- lays the 
groundwork for some important insights into the managerial investment. 
decision process. It does not redefine the accountant's prescription for 
investment rationality, but instead extends that rationality to a point of 
predictive utility. It provides a framework into which the psychologist 
can cast his contribution, and in which the practicing manager can better 
understand the meaning of his intuitions. In the end, it is a model that 
should help all three (the accountant, the psychologist, and the practicing 
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Footnotes'. 
.The calculations for Time-Adjusted Rates-of-Return are compound 
interest calculations, Imagine that you have $1 today. There is some 
amount of money you would be willing to accept two years from now in 
exchange for foregoing the use of your $1 for the intervening two years. 
If you knew you wanted to make a 20% annual return on your $1 for the 
two years, the amount you should receive at the end of two years would 
be given by ($1)x(1.20)x(1.20)=$1.44 . The Tine-Adjusted Rate-of-Return 
is calculated simply by working this process backwards. If someone 
offered you $2 two years in the future in exchange for the use of your 
$1 starting today for.two years, you would know that ($1)x(R)x(R)=$2, 
. where R refers to the annual rate of return received for the use of your 
$1 for the two years. Solving for R, (R)x(R)=2, or R=1.41 . Therefore, 
if someone offered you $2 two years from now for the use of your $1 for 
two years, you would be looking at a Time-Adjusted Rate-of-Return of 
41% on your investment over the two years. Notice that this figure is 
equivalent to the discounting rate which would put the Net Present Value 
of the investment at zero. For more complex cost and revenue streams, the 
calculations .are more complicated. For instance, for the column 2 revenue 
stream and ray/2 cost stream in Table 2, the Time-Adjusted Rate-of-Return 
would be calculated from the following equation: 















)+1245 (R) +1475 
For a more detailed explanation of these calculations, the reader is urged 
to consult an accounting text, such as Horngren (1982). 
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Abstract  
This paper examines the course of action concept (Stave, 1981) in terms of 
the interdependencies created in a sequence of decisions. Case studies of 
courses of action, collected using focus groups with managers, are used to 
develop a typology of interdependencies. Theoretical and empirical 
implications, especially for future escalation research, are discussed. 
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Staw, in his research on escalation (e.g., Staw, 1976; Staw and Fox, 1977) 
and in a capstone review (Staw, 1981) has called attention to a variety of 
behavioral issues regarding decision making in situations requiring a sequence 
or series of decisions. These particular sequences are referred to as courses 
of action. The sequential aspect of decisions in a course of action implies 
that these decisions are, in some fashion linked. This linkage, which we 
refer to as an interdependency, is arguably a crucial aspect of courses of 
action and is proposed here as the essential feature of their architecture. 
An Exemplar of Interdependency  
Staw (1981) provides several real-life exemplars of courses of action. 
One of these is Chicago's "Deep Tunnel" project which proposed to dig 131 
miles of shafts, reservoirs and pumping stations to solve some severe drainage 
problems. When only 10% into the project, it became clear that the total cost 
would be much greater than anticipated and, perhaps, would not be justified by 
the benefits. A second example is a stock holder who buys stock at $50/share 
and its price falls to $20/share. He then buys more and it falls again. He 
is then faced with another decision to buy, hold or sell. Each project is 
subject to very different types of interdependency and their contrast can be 
used to illustrate the interdependency concept. 
In Deep Tunnel, the money spent on the 10% of the project completed is a 
sunk cost, but it is not a loss. It would be a loss only if the project was 
terminated and all of the completed work scrapped or sold for its salvage 
value. If the project was completed, the loss or gain due that 10% would 
depend on the economic performance of the overall project, the point being 
that the 10% of the project completed, although it is a sunk cost, is not 
irrelevant to determining the overall performance of the project if 
completed. Stated a bit differently, the 10% completed is an asset with some 
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impact on future returns, meaning that in order to get the anticipated return 
at the point 10% has been invested, one need only invest an additional 90% of 
the total cost. From an economic standpoint, that 10% is hardly worthless and 
greatly impacts the present value of the remainder of the project. 1 There is, 
therefore, an economic interdependency between the 10% (asset) and the 
remaining 90%. Without tha 10%, the present value of the remaining 90% would 
typically be much lower. 
No economic interdependency exists in the stock example. The purchase of 
$50/share stock has no implications for the return that would accrue from . 
 stocks purchased at $20/share (or at any price) at a later point in time. In 
a sense, each share of stock purchased is of itself a."project" with its 
unique cost and return function. Although the treatment of stocks as a 
portfolio can create financial interdependencies similar to those in the Deep 
Tunnel case, such a treatment is purely discretionary and not predetermined by 
the project type. Note also, that portions of a stock portfolio can always be 
sold, whereas such options may not be available in a construction project. 
The major issue is that the particular type of interdependency(ies) 
linking decisions in courses of action is likely to have an important 
influence on the decision making of the allocator. To the extent that 
financial interdependencies exist, it can be shown that for many classes of 
projects allocating additional funds is not "throwing good money after bad" 
but is, in fact, financially rational (Northcraft, Wolf and Conlon, 1982). 
'For financially interdependent decisions, a variety of normative models exist 
which, if the decision makers adhere to them, makes explaining their 
allocations fairly simple. The behaviorally interesting phenomena are those 
1A quantitative proof is available, on request,. from the authors. 
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situations when (1) a financially normative model exists and is not adhered to 
or (2) non-financial forms of interdependencies appear to mediate the decision 
process, one of these being the "portfolio thinking" implied by Staw's 
investor example. 
Interdependencies in Prior Allocation Research  
Prior studies of allocation have not explicitly manipulated the 
interdependencies, but the two cases that have been used in these studies, 
"The A & S Financial Case" (Staw, 1976; Staw and Fox, 1977) and "The World 
Bank Case" (Staw and Ross, 1978; Conlon and Wolf, 1980) appear to differ in 
the type of interdependency created. In the A & S case, subjects allocated 
funds to the R & D department of a firm with the goal of improving the 
financial performance of the firm. They were later given data showing the 
overall performance of the firm in the five years following the allocation. 
In the setback condition, no improvement occurred, and subjects were asked to 
make a future allocation of some amount. In the World Bank case, subjects 
made an allocation to build an industrial project in a developing nation 
(e.g., a hydroelectric plant) and were later told that the project is only 
one-half complete for a particular reason (e.g., heavy rain, corruption, etc.) 
and were asked to allocate again. 
The differences in interdependencies are obvious. In the A & S case, the 
relationship between the first allocation and the second allocation is totally 
ambiguous. For example, one can assume that the first allocation has resulted 
in the development of several new products and that all that is needed are 
funds for additional engineering work before performance will be turned around 
(e.g., the glass is nearly full), or one can assume that the earlier funds 
were totally ineffectual (e.g., the glass is empty). The wisdom of future 
funding clearly depends on the relationship assumed between past and future 
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funding. In the World Bank case, the interdependency is far more explicit. 
The decision maker knows that half of the project is completed and the reason 
for the setback. Conlon and Wolf (1980) show how a mathematical calculation 
can be used to determine the appropriate future funding in this case and 
provide evidence for the use of that calculation by some subjects. 
It should be clear that the type of interdependency created in these cases 
is crucial to evaluating the internal and external validity of the studies 
which utilize them. In the A & S case, for which an escalation tendency has 
been demonstrated, how important is the assumption made by the allocator 
regarding the efficacy of the first allocation? If subjects were given 
explicit reasons for the failure of the funds to produce results (e.g., 
incompetent scientists and engineers; placing all the funds on a single idea 
that did not work, etc.), would the same results accrue? Escalation has never 
been demonstrated using the World Bank study.' One can only speculate, but 
perhaps that failure is due, in part, to the interdependencies produced in the 
case. 
The above observations highlight the need for developing experimental case 
stimuli which explicitly mirror the architecture of courses f action as they 
occur in organizations. The next section of this paper reports on a set of 
cases collected from working managers using focus groups interview 
techniques. These interviews, in which managers described actual cases of 
decisions involving sunk costs, are used to identify and illustrate the forms 
of interdependencies that occur in organizational courses of action. 
MANAGERIAL DESCRIPTIONS OF SUNK COST EXPERIENCES  
Sample  
In an attempt to learn more about the development and treatment of sunk 
costs in allocation contexts involving courses of action, the authors 
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conducted focus group interviews with managers from a convenience sample of 
nine corporations. This sample included four corporations devoted essentially 
to the manufacturing, marketing and delivery of hard goods, four corporations 
devoted to the marketing and delivering of essential non-financial services 
and one financial service organization. All of these were private sector 
firms. With the exception of the financial corporation and one of the 
manufacturing firms, interviews were held with small groups of top level 
managers who were deemed by our various contacts in these organizations to be 
or to have been centrally involved in financial allocation decisions. In the 
financial corporation, two focus groups interviews were held, one with 
corporate controllers and the other with credit managers. In one 
manufacturing firm, one-on-one interviews were held with three senior 
executives regarding a particular product which was removed from the market 
partly because of sunk costs. In all cases, interviews were conducted at 
corporate headquarters with groups where at least one member was a senior 
level (i.e., Vice Presidential or above) executive. Group sizes varied from 
two to six. 
The format used for the interviews was extremely non-directive. There 
were basically three phases to each interview. The first phase was devoted to 
having the managers define "sunk costs" and talk about how they are perceived 
and treated. The second phase asked managers to recall cases of decisions 
that involved sunk costs. The last phase asked the interviewers to summarize 
those factors which may have caused an allocator to consider sunk costs when 
making allocations. 
Tabulation of the Cases  
Audio tapes were used to record the focus group interviews. The 
discussions fluctuated between general observations about decision making and 
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descriptions of specific case episodes. These case episodes were easy to 
identify on the tapes because they were generally given as responses to the 
investigators' requests for specific examples of sunk cost decisions. 
A total of 16 cases were identified. The investigators, for purposes of 
this tabulation, did not attempt to evaluate whether each case was a bona fide  
instance of decision making with sunk costs, but left that judgement to the 
interviewees who presented the case. These cases are tabulated in Table 1 and 
are subdivided by allocations into four basic types: Mergers and 
Acquisitions,- New Products, New Plant, Equipment or Processes and, finally, 
Normal Operations. 
Mergers and Acquisitions are attempts by a firm to secure a new operating 
company. They are acquisitions of ongoing businesses which may or may not be 
similar to the acquiring firm's ongoing business. New Products are 
allocations made to cover the costs of bringing new products or services to 
.market and, more specifically, may cover development costs or costs of 
establishing new markets. New Plant, Equipment or Processes are allocations 
to acquire new capital or establishing new processes in order to continue or 
become more effective in the ongoing business. Normal Operations are 
expenditures made to cover everyday costs. 
The cases are described according to the type of business in which the 
case originated, a brief description of the allocation, a brief description of 
the setback and why it occured and the current disposition of the product or 
project for which the allocation was made. These are largely self 
explanatory. 
Types of Interdependencies  
Cases were reviewed for the type of interdependency implied; that is, in 
what ways were the initial decision and subsequent decisions to continue 
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interrelated. Five forms of interdependency were determined: Financial 
considerations, environment and market considerations, technological 
considerations, resource utilization considerations, corporate strategy 
(strategic) considerations and personal considerations. 
The most frequent form of interdependency was financial. Even failures 
can create assets and the existence of ready assets may affect subsequent 
decisions. An example of this from our cases was a firm that because it had a 
full inventory of parts devoted to old engines, delayed the replacement of the 
old engines with new, more efficient ones even though the cost-effectiveness 
of the delay could be questioned. The major issue is that large, immediate 
write-offs can have an important impact on the confidence that investors, 
suppliers and clients may hold toward a firm. 
A second type of interdependence concerns environment 	market. 
Resource allocations can sometimes constitute commitments to constituencies 
external to a firm. One firm gave the example of two unPrlitable plants, one 
located in a major urban center, the other in a semi-rural community. The 
firm closed down its urban facility, but reallocated its amoral facility to a 
more profitable operating division. The reason was that b the small town, 
the firm was a major employer and had a felt commitment tithe community. A 
somewhat different example was a firm's retaining certain =profitable product 
lines because of either believed interdependencies with der profitable  
products (e.g., the ability to sell a complete system) or:eit prior 
commitments , to clients that they would continue to carryaproduct. 
A third type of interdependency concerns technologicconsiderations. 
One firm gave an example of resurrecting and modifying anted prototype in 
bidding on new business to fit the needs of new potentialTilents. The 
reasons for this were two-fold. First, the development is associated with 
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the new bid would probably be lower, but it was also the case that the felt 
risk of the bidding firm was also less. Stated a bit differently, the bidders 
felt that because all of the necessary steps through producing a prototype had 
already been taken, many of the uncertainties involved in product pricing, 
especially those involving start-up costs, had already been eliminated. In a 
way, these are really "sunk benefits". We have labeled such considerations 
technological, because they involve the impact of prior allocations, even 
failures, on learning how to do things and the contingencies that ultimately 
affect success and/or failure. Generally speaking, the more comlex the 
technology or process that is being dealt with, the more likely will be the 
sunk benefits of prior experience. 
A fourth form of interdependency involved strategic resource  
utilization. These interdependencies would be most likely in contexts where 
state-of-the-art technologies create areas of special expertise which cannot 
easily be bought in the labor market. In such cases, a firm might continue a 
failing project and incur further costs just to have something interesting for 
key personnel to do before a new project is initiated. One firm gave the 
example of a project from which the management never expects to directly 
benefit that is periodically resurrected to keep strategically important teams 
of engineers and designers busy. 
A fifth and extremely interesting interdependency involved corporate  
strategy. Strategy produces interdependency by (1) creating general themes, 
policy or plans that place particular allocations in some sequence of intended 
actions and (2) providing institutional support and justification for 
actions. The most obvious forms such strategies take are the long-term 
business plan and statement of corporate policy and objectives. In these 
forms, the jointly defined strategies of top management become externalized 
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and give the appearance of consensus on "where a company is going". 
Consequently, such plans are potentially powerful tools for justifying 
actions. In our cases, we saw an instance of corporate strategy, in part, 
justifying a five year loss in the branch office case, and strategy, in part, 
justifying the removal of a product whose per unit profit potential was 
greater than any other in the Tim. The interesting aspect of this process is 
that the economic wisdom of a given strategy (i.e., compared to alternatives) 
is generally more difficult to objectively ascertain and verify than that of 
any single investment decision and, therefore, the use of a plan to justify a 
particular decision is not necessarily economically rational. Nonetheless, 
strategy appears to be an important force in determining the persistence of 
allocators in the face of successes or failures. 
The sixth and final type of interdependence is personal. This type of 
interdependency has been the major focus of previous research and refers to 
individual beliefs that decisions are somehow linked with regard to their 
implications for the person. For example, an attempt to "recover" sunk costs 
by allocating additional funds may be motivated by self-justification or 
justification to others. Both of these are attempts to protect one's self-
image or reputation, hence this concern for image becomes a personal factor 
linking two or more decisions. This factor was noted explicitly in one of our 
cases where a losing subsidiary was retained because of the'corporate 
president's involvement in its acquisition. The decision to retain was, 
importantly, made against the loud protest of corporate comptrollers and 
strategists. The idea of ego protection was also noted in two other 
interviews. 
In summary, the interviews served to identify and illustrate six ways in - 
which decisions may be interdependent. These interdependencies illustrate the 
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complexity of the allocation decision and the importance of the decision 
making environment in determining the actual amount allocated. 
Implications for Theory  
The cases suggest a variety of ways in which decisions may take place in 
an interdependent sequence. We suggest that these interdependencies create 
what Staw has labeled "courses of action". The theme that has been advanced 
in the previous research on courses of action is the general concept of 
retrospective sensemaking or, more specifically, self-justification of past 
actions (Stave, 1981). The theme is conceptually appealing partially because 
its relationship to "rationalizing" views of man (Aronson, 1976) and "counter-
normative" implications for allocation behavior. The problem with that 
perspective, as the cases suggest, is its narrowness. The cases provide ample 
evidence for an impact of past decisions on subsequent decisions that may lead 
to systematic deviations from economic rationality. The relative importance 
of rationalizing for explaining such deviations remains an empirical issue. 
The cases, in their exposition of the wide ranging motives of allocators 
faced with sunk costs, suggest that allocations result from a variety of 
complex and, possibly, conflicting or interacting forces. The only central 
theme appears to be that each form of interdependency may attach a particular 
array of costs and benefits to any given alternative. For example, financial 
interdependencies carry implications, especially through accounting 
conventions, for the stated performance of the organization (department, 
subunit, etc.) following a particular choice. Similarly, the honoring (or 
ignoring) of external commitments would engender a set of costs and benefits 
such as enhancement (or depreciation) of reputation, intrinsic payoffs (for 
doing the "right" or "wrong" thing) and so forth. The most interesting issues 
involve how the interdependencies alone, in combination with others and in 
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interaction with the decision maker's environment affect allocations. For 
example, would external commitments to a community play the same role in a 
munificient as in a meager environment? Do cognitive consistency effects 
occur when escalation has clear economic costs (i.e., boundary conditions)? 
What is the relationship between groupthink as strategy formulation and 
adherence to particular projects? The pragmatic application of the escalation 
and commitment research clearly demands inquiry on such issues. 
Implications for Research Design  
The financial allocation cases used in previous escalation and commitment 
research appear to suffer from insufficient attention to the architecture of 
the courses of action they create. They tend to be sporadic in their 
provision of financial data and non-specific in their definition of 
interdependencies (e.g., was the time 1 R & D expenditure an "asset 
creator?"). We suspect that real world decision makers, when faced with such 
ambiguities, would either search for more information or treat the decision as 
very risky. At the very least, these ambiguities have probably added to the 
error variance and, in some cases, may endanger internal validity. 
A systematic and externally valid program of research on allocations in 
courses of action should carefully design experimental materials that 1) are 
explicit about interdependencies and 2) treat interdependencies as independent 
variables. Because the cases used to elicit decision from allocators 
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TABLE 1  
A Tabulation of the Sunk Cost Cases 
Brief Description  
Overseas acquisition. 
Firm buys former over-
seas licensee 
Bought a small firm 













lergers and Acquisitions  
Firm Type  
. Manufacturing-
high technology 












ew Products  






Bought a small bank. 
Brief Description  
Entered new emerging 
market with new 
products. 
Designed new product 
. for a certain large 
• customer's use. 
Designed, assembled 
and marketed a new 
product that would 
serve a new market 
for the firm. 
*Underestimated 
start up costs, 
overpaid. 
Cause of Setback 
*Entered market 5 
years too early, 
carrying costs 
not recouped. 







problems with 	- 





costs due to 
marketing expenses 















*High start up and *Financial 
carrying costs 
because of time 
lags due to (1) 
perfecting processes 





costs due to slow 
development, 






New Plant Equipment or Processes  
Brief Description  
Plants devoted to 
certain unprofitable 




prior to full 
depreciation. 
Firm opened branch 
office expecting to 
lose .5 million over 
5 years. 
Old engine parts 




dollar piece of 
equipment to make 
engine repairs 





Firm purchased a 
computer to eliminate 
- a large, labor 
intensive sequence of 
tasks. Were dis-
satisfied with pro-
gress and price of 
implementation. 





























market with high 
	
*Strategic 
start up costs. 
*Rapid technological *Financial 
change spurred on 




Normal Operations  





Brief Description  
Firm spent $25,000 
preparing an invited 
bid on a very large 
project, then 
declined to bid. 
Firm spent a large 
amount on an ad-
vertising campaign 


















unfamiliar with the 
type of project. 






may never recoup 
development costs. 
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THE IMPACT OF SETBACK CHARACTERISTICS ON SUBSEQUENT FINANCIAL 
ALLOCATIONS: ESCALATION AND WITHDRAWAL PROPENSITIES 1 
Marya L. Leatherwood, The University of Iowa 
Edward J. Conlon, The University of Iowa 
• 
ABSTRACT 
• Using a sample of working managers and an allo-
cation case modeled after actual land development 
decisions, a study was conducted to investigate 
the impact of setback foreseeability, likely per-
sistence and diffusability of blame on subsequent 
allocations within the commitment/escalation para-
digm. The results indicate the importance of dif-
fusability of blame and persistence. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper reports an empirical study which 
investigated the impact of different types of set-
backs on managerial resource allocations. Alt-
hough, as in most of the previous escalation and 
commitment studies, it was a laboratory simula-
tion, the subjects were experienced practicing 
managers and the task was based on an actual 
investment scenario. Another methodological 
improvement was the use of multiple measures of 
allocation tendencies and commitment. Finally, 
the study yielded new and potentially important 
information about how the nature of a setback may 
affect subsequent allocation behavior. 
Theoretical Rationale 
Over the last seven years, a series of articles 
have appeared in the organizational behavior lit-
erature examining the impact of setbacks on subse-
quent resource allocation behavior (Stow, 1976; 
Stew and Fox, 1977; Staw and Ross, 1978; Fox and 
Stew, 1979; Conlon'and Wolf, 1980). The primary 
tendency or 'bias" demonstrated in these studies 
is escalation in situations where the decision 
maker feels responsible for the decision leading 
to the setback. Although two studies, both of 
which used the "World Bank Case" (Stew and Ross, 
1978; Conlon and Wolf, 1980), instead of demons-
trating the escalation tendency, produced the 
opposite tendency of withdrawal from the previ-
ously chosen course of action. 
This study primarily addresses the impact that 
the nature of the setback might have on allocation 
tendencies. The impact of the type of setback on 
allocations was illustrated in an analysis by Stew 
and Ross (1978) on the four different setbacks 
used in their study, which were: (1) corruption 
of local officials, (2) a failure of the workers 
1 Work on this paper was supported in part by NSF 
Grant MN-8616275, "Resource Allocation With 
Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Approach. 
to respond to economic incentives, (3) illiteracy 
of the local workers or (4) rain. The study was 
designed so that subjects were provided informa-
tion about the first three types of setback in 
advance of their decision. Each type of setback 
was associated with a particular region in which 
an industrial complex could be built. Depending 
on the region chosen, the subject was told that 
the project was not completed in the allowed 
budget because of the particular setback associ-
ated with that region. Because the subject had 
prior knowledge of the potential for these three 
setbacks, they were referred to, by Stow and Ross, 
as endogenous. Rain was the only exogenous set-
back, and was made so by not giving subjects prior 
information about the possibility of torrential 
rains in the region. Although the investigators 
were primarily interested in the endogenous-exoge-
nous distinction, they performed a post hoc analy-
sis on the allocations made following the three 
endogenous setbacks and found considerable vari-
ance in allocations resulting from each of the 
three types, There was no difference between the 
allocations made in the illiteracy (ie. endoge-
nous) and the rain (ie..exogenous) condition. 
There were differences between rain and the other 
two endogenous causes with the allocation follow-
ing the corruption setback being considerably 
lower than the allocation following the work 
incentives setback. Data on subjects' beliefs 
about the likelihood that the setback would per-
sist, that financing would overcome the setback 
and that the government (of the Third World Coun-
try) was responsible for the setback indicated 
that the three endogenous setbacks varied syste-
matically on a continuum of the liklihood that the 
setback might either continue or be overcome and 
that the mapping of this continuum onto alloca-
tions was essentially linear. The less likely the 
setback was to continue, the greater the alloca-
tion. There was not a clear relationship between 
the felt responsibility of the government and the 
allocation. Given the linearity of the first 
relationship, one might expect that expressed con-
fidence in the efficacy of further resources allo-
cated could explain the differences among the 
allocations following each type of setback. The 
mean allocations following earn type of setback 
further subdivided by expressed confidence (ie. a 
median split on a 7 point confidence scale) showed 
that even taking confidence into account there 
were substantial differences in the allocations 
made following the various setbacks. This result 
suggested that there may be additional factors 
associated with each setback that affect alloca-
tion tendencies. 
In order to thoroughly understand the impact of 
setbacks on allocations it is necessary to develop 
theory at a more particularistic level of analysis 
than previous escalation and commitment studies. 
The theoretical rationale in prior studies uti-
lized either cognitive dissonance or reactance 
theory to explain allocation phenomena. In the 
Stew and Ross study discussed above, reactance 
theory was used to explain the results obtained 
from the endogenous/exogenous partition (ie. in 
combination with other experimental factors). 
Reactance theory cannot, by itself, explain the 
variation in responses to the endogenous setbacks. 
Conlon and Wolf (1980), in a study based on the 
Stew and Ross design, provide a more micro level 
explanation for allocation tendencies by suggest-
ing that allocations are mediated by a cognitive 
strategy which may differ among allocators depend-
ing on both individual and informational differ-
ences. The nature of the setback may direct the 
strategy used by the allocator. In the present 
study, the major focus was on the justification 
aspects of allocation strategies. 
Hypotheses 
In escalation and commitment studies, an allo-
cator is faced with a situation where he/she has 
made a commitment to a project, but the project 
has apparently failed to meet expectations and 
he/she may not only be cognitively "trapped" by 
the need to self-justify the earlier allocation 
but also trapped by the need to justify his/her 
actions to "significant others" in the organiza-
tion (e.g. to manage one's image). The need to 
justify is hypothesized to result from the amount 
of responsibility that the allocator feels for the 
setback, the greater the felt responsibility, the 
greater the motivation to justify. This study 
' hypothesized that certain characteristics of set-
backs, in particular (1) the likelihood that the 
setback would persist and (2) the availability of 
a third party on whom to place blame would affect 
allocations. The prior literature suggests that 
the allocator becomes entrapped when he/she feels 
responsible for a setback. Cognitive consistency 
theory has then been used to hypothesize continu-
ing allocations as a function of the entrapment. 
It is important to note, however, that there are 
boundaries on the entrapment effect. Brockner, 
Rubin and Lang (1979) show that the degree of 
entrapment (escalation) is mediated by the antici-
pated costs and benefits of further commitment. 
In particular, as the expected costs are 
increased, entrapment - becomes less likely and 
withdrawal may become the preferred way to 'save 
face". Along those lines, we predicted that in a 
situation where an allocator feels responsible, 
there is no third party and the setback is likely 
to persist, the , beat option available to the allo-
cator would be to withdraw from the project and 
take one's losses because, in the face of high 
risk (ie. high likelihood of additional losses), 
It may be the economically rational choice and the 
only arguably acceptable one in a for-profit, 
business environment. Escalation, the tendency to 
allocate more funds to a failing venture, would 
seem to make sense when blame is clearly inescapa-
ble for the allocator, but the setback is not 
likely to persist. In this case, the allocator is 
provided with the options of (1) being consistent, 
a valued aspect of managers (Ross and Stew, 1980) 
and (2) framing the initial setback as a necessary 
learning experience. Finally, when blame is 
attributable to a third party such as a corrupt 
official, a union or an incompetent architect, the 
allocator can best emphasize blame by withholding 
support either to punish the third party or to 
avoid additional involvement with a project made 
risky by the third party. The latter phenomenon 
differs from the first instance of withdrawal (ie. 
because of no other rational options) in that it 
is lees dependent on the attributions of persis-
tence of the setback, hence withdrawal for the 
purpose of diffusing blame should not depend on 
attributions of persistence. 
The present study manipulated foreseeability of 
setback, type. of setback and persistence of set-
back. Foreseeability refers to whether the deci-
sion maker had prior knowledge of the potential 
for the particular setback and was intended to 
create differential feelings of responsibility. 
Type refers to whether the setback was due to a 
technical (ie. non-third party) failure or a labor 
induced (ie. third-party) cause. Persistence 
refers to information provided regarding the like-
lihood that the'particular setback could occur 
again. Our hypotheses, more formally stated, were 
as follows: 
(1) The tendency to continue the project 
will be greatest when the setback is 
foreseeable, the setback does not 
involve a third party and the setback is 
not likely to persist. 
(2) The tendency to withdraw will be 
greatest when the setback is foreseeable 
and either (a) the setback involves a 
third party or (b) the setback does not 




Sixty-eight business students enrolled in exe-
cutive and part time MBA programs volunteered to 
participate in what was described as a decision 
making study. The participants ranged in age from 
22 to 45 years (mean ■ 31.85), reported 1 to 19 
years with their present organizations (mean ■ 
6.69), and 3 months to 10 years in their current 
positions (mean ■ 2.92). Subjects reported spend-
ing an average of about 501 of their time on man-
agerial functions. 
Task 
The basic task required subjects to analyze a 
case involving the funding of a land development 
project in one of several Southeastern cities. 
Case scenarios were constructed based upon infor-
mation obtained from land development officers of 
two major corporations in the southeastern region 
of the United States and were designed to depict, 
as closely as possible, the information available 
to administrators in those firms regarding pro-
spective projects. The scenarios described the 
role of the subject as being a vice president in 
charge of projects for Conwood, Inc., a land 
development corporation, whose duties included 
selection of commercial projects, evaluation of 
projects over time and subsequent allocations to 
projects during the construction horizon. Each 
case included two project proformas (i.e. propo-
sals) for office buildings to be located in Birm-
ingham, Alabama and Jacksonville, Florida. The 
proformas included financial information on con-
struction costs, land costs, finance rates, pro-
jected occupancy rates, leasing rates and antici-
pated annual cash flows in future years. Net 
present values (NPV) were computed for each pro-
ject with the obtained values being comparable 
within the range of a few dollars. In addition, 
three specialists'_ reports were included for the 
Birmingham and Jacksonville projects. These 
reports (from the Market Specialist, the Con-
tracting Specialist and the Financial Specialist 
of Conwood) provided similar information regarding 
site locations, predicted demands for office 
space, corporate growth patterns in the particular 
locale and so forth. 
These case scenarios were pilot tested by eight 
business students who were asked to provide verbal 
protocols during their initial selection between 
the two office projects with respect to funding. 
Analysis of these protocols indicated that an 
equal selection between the office buildings was 
occuring and that the choices appeared to be based 
upon random attention to various pieces of infor-
mation. That is, all individuals recognized the 
NPVs as being equal, reported that the sites both 
appeared to be suitable, and proceeded to select 
based upon ideosyncratic patterns. 
Procedure 
Cases were distributed randomly and fairly 
equally according to the following four classifi-
cationi: 
1) No information with respect to a strike 
(Not Foreseeable. Strike) 
2) A yarning that a strike might occur (Foresee-
able, Strike) 
3) Information regarding sitework risks for the 
locale with reassurance by the contracting spe-
cialist that no problems should occur (Not Fore-
seeable, Sitework), and 
4) A warning regarding the potential risks 
involved with the site of the project (Foresee-
able, Sitework). 
All individuals in each category were asked to 
select either the Jacksonville or the Birmingham 
project as the commercial project for the south-
eastern region. The construction horizon was two 
years for each office building, thus the chosen 
project would be funded in two parts: one-half the 
development costs should be allocated at the pre-
sent time; at the beginning of the next fiscal 
year (in order to create the effect of time, this 
second decision was made after one week had 
elapsed) the project would be reviewed and the 
decision regarding allocations should be made at 
that time. All subjects were told that this was 
according to corporate policy. 
At time two (one week following the initial 
selection of the Birmingham or the Jacksonville 
project), individuals in each of the four classi-
fications were told that a setback (either a 
strike or sitework problems) had occured resulting 
in a overrun cost of one million dollars. The 
feedback report also included persistence informa-
tion. One half of the individuals in each setback 
classification were told that the problem had been 
resolved (A labor contract had been signed in the 
strike conditions while the construction problem 
had been solved in the sitework condition), while 
the other half of the decision makers were told 
that the setback had not been fully resolved and 
fairly ambiguous news regarding the likelihood of 
continuing problems was given (The contract had 
not yet been signed for the strike conditions and 
a number of influential leaders were stated to be 
in opposition to a resolution; for the sitework 
categories, it was stated that the work to date 
may result in allieviating the construction prob-
lem but at the present time it was uncertain if 
the new construction technique had been effec-
tive). 
Measures 
Multiple measures were designed and utilized to 
gain information about how the nature of a setback 
might potentially affect allocation tendencies and 
commitment on the part of decision makers. At 
time two, subjects were: (1) asked to decide on a 
second allocation to the initially chosen project, 
(2) requested to allocate a sum of money to a cost 
overrun account that would be specifically ear-
marked for that particular project (the decision 
makers were not given guidelines for this alloca-
tion although the previous setback had amounted to 
one million dollars and had been covered by a gen-
eral slush fund account), (3) given a memo regard-
ing a potential buyer for the project and asked to 
name a reccommended asking price and (4) requested 
to give a priority rating for the sale of the 
project on a four point scale that ranged from low 
priority/continue project to high priority/sell 
project. 
In addition to the multiple dependent measures, 
five manipulation checks were included in a post 
experimental questionnaire to determine the per-
ceived levels of responsibility (self and third 
party), persistence of the setback, potential con-
trol of the setback through continued allocations 
and the degree to which a third party was to blame 
for the project's upset. 
RESULTS 
A complete analysis of variance was conducted 
for the five manipulation checks. Main effects 
for foresceability were found as expected on the 
responsibility felt by the decision maker for the 
setback. Main effects also resulted for type of 
setback (ie. strike vs sitework) on both the res- • 
ponsibility felt by the decision maker for the 
setback and on the degree of blame attributed to a 
third party for the setback. Finally. status of 
the project had a main effect on the perceived 
likelihood that the setback would persist. Sev-
eral interactions were also present for the mani-
pulation checks. Two foreseeability by type 
interactions indicated that greater forseeability 
of setbacks led to greater attributions of fore-
seeablity for strikes and greater attributions for 
the efficacy of future allocations for sitework 
setbacks. Two foreseeability by persistence 
interactions suggested that foreseeability led to 
(1) greater attributions of personal responsibil-
ity for the setback and (2) efficacy of future 
allocations when the setback was resolved than 
when it would persist. Two type by status inter-
actions indicated that greater responsibility and 
blame was attributed to a third party when the 
setback was a strike that had the possibility of 
persisting. 
Multivariate analysis of variance was used to 
simultaneously analyze the effects of foreseeabil-
ity, persistence and type of setback on the multi-
ple dependent measures. The Pillais-Bartlett mul-
tivariate test of significance indicated 
significant multivariate effects for persistence 
(F 4,51 ■ 2.8035; p < .035) and foreseeability by 
type (F 4,51 ■ 3.8673; p < .008). As suggested by 
Borgen and Seling (1978), follow up univariate 
ANOVAs and discriminant analyses were used for 
interpretation because the four dependent measures 
showed zero-order inter-correlations ranging from 
-.45 to .24(i.e. moderate multicollinearity). As 
is evident in Table 1, the two variables signifi-
cantly affected by persistence of the project were 
the recommended asking price suggested by the 
decision maker and the subsequent priority rating 
given for the sale of the project. The correla-
tions between the dependent variables and the 
canonical variables were also fairly high for ask-
ing price and the priority for sale measure. The 
foreseeability by type interaction seemed to be 
based mainly on the priority for sale rating with 
the corresponding correlation being .69. 
The results provided partial support for the 
hypotheses. The significant interaction was a 
complete crossover indicating that the desire to 
withdraw from a project (ie. as indicated by ask-
ing price and selling priority) was greater for 
sitework in the not-foreseeable case and greater 
for the strike in the foreseeable case. This sup-
ports the hypothesized role of diffusability of 
blame. As indicated in Figure 1, the highest ask-
ing price was recommended when the setback did not 
involve a third party, was not expected to persist 
and was foreseeable by the decision maker. In the 
other conditions, either not involving a third 
party or entailing setbacks that were likely to 
continue, the recommended asking price ranged from 
10.1 million to 11.9 million with the latter ask-
ing price occuring for setbacks that had been 
resolved. Persistence did not significantly 
affect the propensity to withdraw in the sitework 
condition as hypothesized, but the mean propensity 
to sell was equal in both which seems to counter, 
to some extent, the main effect for persistence. 
It should be noted that the asking prices fell 
closely in the range of the net present values for 
the projects at time 2 subsequent to cost overruns 
while the asking price of 14.9 million for the 
former condition is much greater than the 11.3 NPV 
for the projects. 	. 
An examination of the priority ratings for the 
sale of the projects show support for the tendency 
to escalate when a third party was not involved, 
the setback was foreseeable and the setback had 
been resolved. However, it should be noted that 
decision makers also showed a hesitation to recom-
mend the sale of projects that were likely to have 
continuing setbacks as long as these setbacks were 
foreseeable but lid not involve third parties in 
the cost overages. However, the projects in this 
condition were priced for sale at current NPVs, 
suggesting commitment was not as great as in the 
resolved setback persistence condition. 
Conclusions and Discussion 
The contribution of this study to the theories 
of escalation and comitment was to shed light on 
how certain characteristics of setbacks may affect 
how allocators frame the cause of the project fai-
lures. In particular, the presence of a third 
party as a 'cause - of the setback provided ways in 
which blame could be diffused by the allocator. 
Additionally, the study reveals the importance of 
the attributed persistence of setbacks on•alloca-
tions. In a real business environment, it seems 
unlikely that allocators would allocate to a pro-
ject when that project was very likely to fail 
again, regardless of responsibility for past 
events. 
This study also represents a methodological 
advance in its use of multiple measures of commit-
ment to the project. Because financial alloca-
tions are best regarded as complex behaviors which 
could be affected by a wide range of contradictory 
or interacting motives, it seems especially impor-
tant to utilize multiple measures. Space limita-
tions do not permit an adequate discussion of the 
similarities and differences among the four mea-
sures, their covariance structure and important 
differences in the results obtained for each mea-
sure. It must suffice to say that each measure 
appeared to have its particular set of ideosyncra-
des vis a vis the experimental manipulations, 
although the multivariate results were unambigu-
ous. The case, as well, represents an advance. 
This was the first escalation study to utilize a 
case which provided full financial information 
about the various alternatives and which was based 
on the materials and parameters used in an actual 
organizational environment. 
Further studies of financial allocations should 
carefully consider the characteristics of the set-
backs used to induce the failure experiences. 
Care should be taken to identify how the nature of 
these setbacks interact with the variables being 
manipulated in the study and the way the setbacks 
may direct responses. Future studies should also 
employ cases which adequately alror actual deci- 
sion situations and provide sufficient information 
so that normative models, when they are available, 
may be applied. Future studies, and additional 
analyses on these data, should consider how actual 
allocations deviate from those prescribed by nor-
mative models. 
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THE ECOLOGY OF SUNK COST PROBLEMS 
Gerrit Wolf 
University of Arizona 
Ed Conlon 
University of Iowa 
Sunk cost problems have become an interest of behavioral and economic 
researchers. A sunk cost problem can be characterized as having costs and 
rewards distributed overtime, with costs occuring before the rewards, and a 
decision of whether to continue investing resourses (costs) in order to 
obtain the_future rewards (Northcraft and Wolf, 1984). This paper reports 
on a field study of the diversity of sunk cost problems in organizations 
and to the extent that psychological commitment compared to the ecology of 
.unk cost problems determines the decision to persist with a project. 
Much of the research on sunk cost problems has been done in the 
laboratory. The focus of the research has been on the psychological process 
of commitment and the environmental factors that produce commitment. The 
laboratory research generally has shown that if one couples the responsibility 
of an important decision with some level of negative feedback about the 
decision, the person perseveres to try and turn the projebt around (Brockner 
and Rubin 1982; Staw, 1979) 
Examples, such as the Vietnam War or waiting for a bus, used to 
motivate laboratory research, suggest that the conditions are pervasive. 
What sre the kinds of sunk cost problems found in organizations? This 
paper reports on part of a survey that defines sunk costs in the contexts 
of formal projects rather than informal, personal, or minor problems, as 
studied in the laboratory(Brockner and Rubin, 1982). 
How extensive is psychological commitment as compared to the ecology 
of sunk cost problems as the motivating force underlying persistence in 
sunk cost problems?. Ecology refers to kinds of sunk cost problems and (110 
their associated economic characteristics. The latter are 1)the combination 
of the amount of costs early in the project and the amount of revenues late 
in the project, and 2) the amount of the setback. The types of problems 
induced from free responses focus on different types of internal and external 
projects and types of economic exchange (making, buying and selling). 
Commitment is operationalized as organizational roles relevant to what 
happened in a sunk cost problem. 
Two hypotheses were proposed: 1) The more commited the person the less 
the effect of negative feedback on persistence, and 2) the greater the 
sunkedness (costs early and revenues late) of a project, the less the 
effect of negative feedback on persistence. With no commitment from the 
person or sunkedness from the project, the greater the negative feedback 
the more likely the project is terminated. In other words, commitment and 
between 




Fifty of the largest businesses in Arizona were solicited to parti-
cipate in the research. The chief executive officer of each firm received 
a covering letter and five copies of a questionnaire. The letter requested 
that the executive select five subordinates to respond to each of the five 
questionnaires. Thirty firms participated with a total of 81 usable quest-
ionnaires. 
Instructions 
*This questionnaire asks you to describe an organizational decision 
process related to a less than successful project. It seeks how sunk costs 
are identified and dealt with by managers after a project is started but is 
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not succeeding. To orient you, an example project is described below. The 
questions on page two ask you for information about events prior to, during 
and after the project you choose to report. Think of a project that a 
significant budget, a number of people, and was important. After you think 
of the project, take 15 minutes to answer the questions. Do not spend 
extensive time to research the project. Report your best recollections." 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire had four parts: 1) Background information about the 
manager and the firm, 2) How the project was select, 3) The setback and its 
effects, and 4) An overall evaluation of the project. The latter three 
sections had sections on the financial characteristics of the project. 
Q-astions were asked about the planned revenue stream and the planned cost 
stream. Also, there were questions about the amount of cost over run and 
revenue short fall. These questions reflected a project life cycle view of 
sunk problems(Northcraft and Wolf 1984). 
In addition, there was an open-ended question at the beginning 
that called for the responded to describe the project and a question 
In the middle that asked for a description of the setback. These 
questions were coded after the fact by two independent judges using a 
Q-Sort. All the other questions were ratings on four, seven or ten point 
scales, or judgements of amounts. 
The dependent variable of persistence asked respondents to check one 
of the following items: 1) continued with the project and absorbed the 
effects of the setback, 2) continued and absorbed the setback amd took 
steps to avoid the effects in the future, 3) redefined or revised the 
project making best use the assests, 4) temporarilty or permanently stoped 
the project and attempted to recover salvagable assets. The variable, 
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ACTS, was scored one to four. 
An analysis of variance tested the commitment hypothesis and the 
ecology hypothesis. Independent variables for the commitment hypothesis 
were the magnitude of the setback and the degree of responsibility of the 
person. The independent variables for the ecology hypothesis were type of 
sunk cost problems, and sunkedness of the problem. A model using the 
variables (defined below) PROB, SUNK, SETB, NEG and ROLE as main effects 
and as two-way interactions was constructed. This model tested the ecology 
hypothesis using the SUNK by NEG interaction and the commitment hypothesis 
was tested using the ROLE by NEG interaction. The variables PROB and SETB 
were used to control for other possible hypotheses. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the frequency of types and economic magnitude of 
sunk cost problems, the frequency of type and magnitude of the setback, 
and the mean persistence outcome as a function of the problem and 
setback variables. This table describes the independent and variables 
before hypothesis testing. 
These results show that the majority of sunk cost problems involve 
producing a product or service, but 20% involved buying and 20% selling. 
Also, half the projects involved products or services for customers 
and the other half for internal use, such as an improved manufacturing 
process. These results show that there is a much wider range of sunk 
problems than found in the laboratory research. In this sample there is 
more persistence in making a product than in selling it and more 
persistence to construction than to internal systems. 
There was no correlation among the problem variaibles accept for 
the fact that one does not sell internal projects. This empty cell 
makes a relationship between the exchange and function defintion of 
projects. Therefore, a variable called PROB was defined as 1) make a 
product or a construction project, 2) make a system or.redesign the 
orgnaization, 3) buy a product or service or real estate, and 4) sell a 
product, service or real estate. 
The economics of sunk cost problems were rated as the extent that costs 
occur early and revenues take place late, as seen in Table 1. Persistence 
increases with earlier costs and with later revenues. An index was 
constructed of the degree of sunk cost of problem by averaging the earliness 
of costs and the lateness of revenues. This variable, called SUNK, had 
three levels: 0) no sunkedness(cost=revenue), 1) some sunkedness (cost 
greater than revenue), 2) large sunkedness (most cost early and most 
revenue late.) 
The kinds of setbacks are categorized in Table 1 as incompetent top 
management, time pressures, bad planning and design of the project, uncon-
trolable third parties, and economic misjudgements of costs and faliable 
forecast of sales. There was no consistent relationship to persistence. 
A new variable, called SETB which varied from internal to external, was 
formed as follows 1) Product (design and time pressures), 2)managing 
(incompetence and misjudged costs) 3) Others (third parties) and 4) weak 
sales. 
The magnitude of the setback, cost overrun or revenue short fall, 
ranged from 5 to 70%. The majority of the projects were judged to have 
large setbacks, as seen in Table I. Actual magnitudes were insufficiently 
reported in order to determine the validity of the judgements. Persistence 
decreased with increased negative feedback. A variable, called NEG was 
defined as 1) 0 to 25%, 2) 26 to 45% and 3) 46% and above. 
Table 2 reports the analysis of variance using PROG, SUNK, SETB, NEG, 
and ROLE as independent variables and ACTS as the dependent variable. 
The two hypothesized interactions of ROLE by NEG for the commitment 
hypothesis and of SUNK by NEG for the ecology hypothesis were not 
si/gnificant, although thhey were in the predicted direction. Significant 
two way interactions were PROG BY SUNK and PROG BY NEG, providing some 
support for the ecology approach, and PROG BY ROLE and SETB BY ROLE, 
partially supporting the commitment approach. 
The PROG by SUNK interaction shows that as sunkedness increases there 
is increasing persistence for make and sell projects, which is consistent 
with economic analysis, while for buy projects as sunkedness increases 
persistence decreases. This may because there is less control in the buy 
situation or that the seller can demand greater investments by the buyer 
before selling, which go beyond the buyers interest. This asymmetry of 
buyer and seller says that the seller is holding out for more while the 
buyer is more likely to get out with higher demands. Figure 1 graphs the 
interaction effect. 
The PROG by NEG interaction shows that persistence increases as 
negative feedback increases for buy projects and internal systems projects, 
while persistence decrease with negative feedback for sales projects and 
making of products or construction. 
The ROLE by PROG interaction shows decreasing persistence as 
commitment increases for make and buy projects, while only sales projects 
shows support for the commitment hypothesis of increasing commitment 
producing increasing persistence. This result contradicts laboratory 
findings. 
The ROLE by SETB interaction shows increasing persistence as 
commitment increases for intrinsic design problems and third party causes 
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of the setback, while there is decreasing persistence as commitment 
increases for managerial causes of the setback and for poor customer 
response as the setback cause. This result is inconsistent with the 
commitment hypothesis. 
DISCUSSION 
Staw (1979) identified the commitment process in sunk cost problems. 
Previous research raised questions about the boundaries of the phenomena 
relative to individual differences (Brockner and Rubin 1982, Conlon and 
Wolf 1980). This field research tried to find the problem ecology boundary 
conditions; It appears that the sunk cost problem is ecologically rich, 
but it remains to be shown that commitment is the pervasive process that 
determines behavior in these problems. 
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TABLE 1 
Relative frequency of types and degree of sunk cost pproblems and type 
and degree of setback and frequency of types of results of sunk cost problems. 





Exchange: 	 Make: 59% XXXXXXXXXXXX 2.6 YYYYYY 
Buy: 23% XXXXX 2.9 YYYYYYYYY 
Sell: 18% XXXX 3.1 YYYYYYYYYYY 
Areas: Construction: 17% XXX 2.6 YYYYYY 
Product/service: 27% XXXXX 3.3 YYYYYYYYYYYYY 
Systems 29% XXXXXX 3.6 YYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY 
Organization Design: 09% XX 3.0 YYYYYYYYYY 
Unknown 17% XXX 2.4 YYYY 
Economic Plan: 
Costs: Unknown: 16% XXX 2.9 YYYYYYYYY 
Earlyist 36% XXXXXXX 2.5 YYYYY 
Earlier 26% XXXXX 2.6 YYYYYY 
Early 7% X 2.7 YYYYYYY 
Late 9% XX 2.8 YYYYYYYY 
Later 6% X 3.0 YYYYYYYYYY 
•Revenues: 	Earlier 6% X 3.0 YYYYYYYYYY 
Early 6% X 3.2 YYYYYYYYYYYY 
Late 9% XX 2.8 YYYYYYYY 
Later 16% XXX 2.5 YYYYY 
Latest 38% XXXXXXXX 2.4 YYYY 
Unknown 24% XXXXX 2.6 YYYYYY 
Setback: 
Type: Upper Management: 5% X 3.0 YTYYYYYYYY 
Time Problems 7% X 2.5 ITYYY 
Outsiders 22% XXXX 3.3 YYYYYYYYYYYYY 
Porject Planning 12% XX 3.1 YYYYYYYYYYY 
Economic costs 17% XXX 3.4 YYYYYYYYYYYYYY 
Sales 17% XXX 3.2 YYYYYYYYYYYY 
Unknown 6% X 2.4 YYYY 
Magnitude: Small: 17% XXX 2.7 YYYYYYY 
Medium: 38% XXXXXXXX 2.9 YYYYYYYYY 
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The study described here examined several important but 
heretofore neglected aspects of the role of commitment in resource-
allocation decisions. Persistence in a course of action in the 
absence of extrinsic justification was used as the behavioral 
indicator of commitment. A simulation exercise using undergraduate 
business students as subjects provided the setting to test several 
hypotheses about the causes and nature of commitment to a course of 
action. The exercise entailed role-playing a college student making 
decisions about whether to stay in or drop a bollege course, in the 
face of negative feedback about his or her progress in the course. 
Results suggest that: (a) choice only fosters commitment to a course 
of action when there is something at stake in the choice, (b) amount 
of commitment is not a linear function of number of choices, (c) 
commitment is not accurately characterized as a suspension of 
rationality, and (d) commitment need not entail misperception of 
feedback about one's progress in a course of action. 
COMMITMENT: 
"BOUNDED IRRATIONALITY" AND OTHER INSIGHTS 
Resource-allocation decisions have been the focus of a considerable 
amount of recent research (e.g., Brockner, Shaw, & Rubin, 1979; Staw, 1981; - 
 Staw & Ross, 1978). A concept often invoked to understand the behavior of 
decision-makers in such situations is commitment. Commitment is 
defined in the American Heritage dictionary as, "the state of being bound 
emotionally or intellectually to some course of action." Apparently, 
this emotional or intellectual binding can profoundly influence behavior. 
In research, commitment has been played off against the rationality 
of economic calculation. It has been used to explain adoption of (e.g., 
Festinger & Carlsmith, 1958), persistence in (e.g., Freedman & Fraser, 1966), 
and even escalation of resources allocated to (e.g., Staw, 1976) a course 
of action when available extrinsic justifications (such as potential 
economic return) cannot account for such behaviors. Thus, commitment is 
invoked when economic calculation, or plausible errors in attempts to make 
economic calculations (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), are no longer com-
pelling descriptions of decision-making behavior. 
Recently, the study of resource-allocation decisions (e.g., Staw 
& Fox, 1977) has suggested that choosing to engage in a behavior fosters 
commitment, even if the choice occurs in the presence of substantial 
extrinsic justification. In these studies, commitment has been thought to 
derive from an individual's adopting a stance of belief in the goodness of 
a course of action -- a stance which may be subject to justification to 
others and norms of consistency (e.g., Sidney, 1978) when the substantial 
Commitment' 
extrinsic justification later disappears. 
Commitment has also been invoked to understand behavior in entrapping 
situations (e.g., Rubin & Brockner, 1975), such as waiting for a bus, or 
being put "on hold" on the telephone. As in situations from the resource-
allocation literature, entrapment entails the decision to spend a valuable 
resource -- usually time -- in pursuit of some valued outcome. However, 
like the forced compliance situations, the perception of having freely 
chosen to spend that resource is retrospective rather than prospective. 
The entrapped individual sees him or herself as freely but inadvertently 
having invested too much to quit (Teger, 1980). Interestingly, persistence 
in such situations is economically justifiable in some circumstances, even 
when the behavior is emotionally 'motivated (Northcraft & Wolf, 1984). 
insert Table 1 about here 
As noted in Table 1, the theoretical literature on commitment (e.g., 
Kiesler, 1971; Salancik, 1977; Staw, 1982) identifies between four and six 
characteristics of decision situations which influence the amount of 
commitment engendered by choosing to engage in a course of action. 
The relationship between commitment and the public explicitness of a 
choice has been well documented. In several studies (Brockner, Shaw, & 
Rubin, 1979; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), subjects chose a course of action, 
wrote the choice down on a piece of paper, and either (a) kept the piece 
of paper to themselves, or (b) gave the piece of paper to the experimenter. 
As predicted, subjects acted more committed to their choice when they had 
to explicitly reveal their choices to the experimenter. 
The relationship between the other situational characteristics noted 
TABLE -1 
KIESLER (1971) 
Freedom of choice 







Salience of choice 
Public explicitness 
Irrevocability 
Repetition of choice 





Salience of action 
Consequences of 
the action 
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above and commitment has been less conclusively demonstrated. The effects 
of irrevocability of a decision was also-studied by Deutsch and Gerard 
(1955). Some subjects were given a "magic pad" on which to record their 
choices; the pad could be "erased" (or so the subjects believed) by lifting 
the top sheet. Subjects with this opportunity to "undo" their previous 
choice demonstrated less commitment than subjects who had to reveal their 
recorded choices to the experimenter, but more commitment than subjects 
who had not recorded their choices at all. Many choices, however, cannot 
be so cleanly "undone" in practice. Once made, even if a choice is changed, 
corrected, or abandoned it nevertheless was made. It is an act which has 
already occurred in time, a fact which cannot be revoked in any meaningful 
sense of the word. 
There remain several ways in which the notion of irrevocability might 
prove meaningful. If a choice is not made public, the decision-maker can 
act lalL the choice was never made. However, operationally this confounds 
irrevocability with the public explicitness of a choice. On the other hand, 
if once made a choice occasions some penalty or loss if changed, corrected, 
or abandoned, then it is irrevocable in the sense that once made things 
(for instance, financially or interpersonally) can never again be as they 
were. In this sense, irrevocability seems confounded with another situa-
tional characteristic noted above -- whether the choice has consequences. 
And further, what seems more likely to provide salience for a choice than 
whether that choice has important consequences and changes forever the 
status quo? The importance of the consequences thus would seem to be a 
critical determinant of the impact of a choice on commitment•o that choice. 
The importance of the consequences of a choice on commitment to that 
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choice has received some attention in the cognitive dissonance literature. 
Several studies (Calder, Ross, & Insko, 1973; Collins & Hoyt, 1972; Hoyt, 
Henley, & Collins, 1972) found that when subjects freely chose to engage in 
attitude-discrepant behaviors, attitudes became more consonant with the 
behaviors only if the behaviors had important consequences. However, in 
these studies, the choice to engage in the attitude-discrepant behaviors 
entailed important consequences for someone other than the subject. This 
leaves open the possibility that the resultant "attitude changes" reflect 
impression management demands (e.g., Gees, Kalle, & Tedeschi, 1978), rather 
than actual changes in belief. 
Furthermore, these studies involved experimental settings where the 
focal choice was attitude-discrepant. Less attention has been paid to 
situations where the focal choice is attitude-consonant and later proves to 
have been an undesirable choice in retrospect. In these situations, a 
different set of cognitive processes would be expected to be operating 
(Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977). In studying the psychology of "bad loans," 
Lewicki (1980) found that the magnitude of a loan does influence how far a 
loan officer or bank is willing to go with a borrower before foreclosing on 
a loan. Lewicki notes, however, that this may reflect survival needs of 
the bank (a large loan in default may take the bank down with it) rather 
than any emotional bond to the lending decision. More typically, resear-
chers have examined the effects of choice (e.g., Staw, 1981), without  
systematically varying the importance of the consequences attached to the 
choice. As yet, no research has examined the impact on commitment of making 
an attitude-consonant choice when the choice changes nothing immediately -- 
entails no immediate positive or negative consequences. We might imagine 
Commitment 
two distinct possibilities: 
Hypothesis 1(a): choice fosters commitment to a course of action, 
independent of the importance of the choice 
(that is, independent of whether the choice has 
consequences) 
Hypothesis 1(b): choice fosters commitment to a course of action 
only when the choice is important (that is, has 
consequences) 
A last situation characteristic mentioned as a determinant of 
commitment -- the number of times a choice has been reaffirmed -- has 
also been neglected. Kiesler (1971) reports a study in which subjects who 
played a particular strategy in a game multiple times were more resistant to 
counter-communication about that strategy than subjects who had only played 
the strategy once or not at all. However, Kiesler's subjects did not 
 choose the strategies they played; the strategies were randomly assigned. 
A more interesting question would seem to be the impact of the number of 
freely chosen repetitions or reaffirmations of the original choice. Three 
plausible alternative hypotheses might be entertained: 
Hypothesis 2(a): commitment reaches a maximum with one choice 
Hypothesis 2(b): commitment reaches an asymptote after several 
choices 
Hypothesis 2(c): commitment is linearly related to choice 
Another related, but also neglected, aspect of commitment research 
concerns the time lag between when a course of action is chosen, and when 
it becomes clear that there is no adequate extrinsic justification for the 
choice. We might imagine, for instance, an executive whose chosen project 
goes bad (removal of extrinsic justification for his chosen course of 
action) the day after he has made the choice to begin the project, versus a 
year after he made the choice. Two alternative hypotheses might be: 
Commitment 
Hypothesis 3(a): the longer the time lag between choice and the 
revelation that there is no extrinsic justification, 
the more "justification" thinking (to oneself or 
others) will have occurred, and therefore the more 
commitment will be evidenced 
Hypothesis 3(b): the longer the time lag between choice and the 
revelation that there is no extrinsic justification, 
the less will be the felt need to justify the 
choice, and therefore the less commitment will be 
evidenced 
Finally, the behavioral manifestations of commitment (adoption, 
persistence, and escalation) have received some attention. Unfortunately, 
most studies have treated these behavioral counterparts of commitment only 
dichotomously. Consequently, few insights have been provided into the 
issue of whether commitment is impervious to the dictates of rational 
economic calculation over repeated reminders of the absence of external 
justification for the behavior. Even learning theory (e.g., Logan, 1969) 
does not suggest that removal of the extrinsic justification for a behavior 
should immediately extinguish the behavior. A more sophisticated account 
of commitment should consider the course of its decay over time. Two 
hypotheses that might be considered are: 
Hypothesis 4(a): choice gives rise to long-term commitment to a 
course of action 
Hypothesis 4(b): choice gives rise only to short-term commitment to a 
course of action; after repeated exposures to 
reminders of the absence of external justification 
for a behavior, extinction of the chosen course of 
action will occur 
The following empirical study extended our understanding of the 
impact of choice on commitment to a course of action. Persistence in the 
course of action in the absence of extrinsic justification was used as the 
behavioral indicator of commitment. A simulation exercise using under-
graduate business students as participants provided the setting to test 
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the four hypotheses outlined above. 
METHOD 
Subjects.  
One hundred seven students from undergraduate Management classes at 
the University of Arizona participated in a class exercise on decision-
making behavior. Participation was voluntary; subjects were randomly 
assigned to experimental conditions. 
The original sample included two classes of students. The data from 
three participants were incomplete, and therefore were not included in the 
analyses. The data from an additional two groups of four participants each 
were also discarded because of suspected collusion (based upon the groups' 
identical and extremely atypical responding, and their members' physical 
proximity during the experimental session). The third class of subjects 
was added to compensate for this attrition from the original sample. 
Design Overview.  
Subjects participated in a paper-and-pencil in-class exercise. In the 
exercise, each subject role-played a college student making decisions about 
whether to stay in a college course. Commitment was operationalized as a 
subject's remaining in the course (persistence) when confronted with 
discouraging feedback about his or her progress in the course. The role-
play dealt with the first thirteen "weeks" of the student's course. This 
setting was chosen for the role-play because of its familiarity to the 
participants. 
There were two independent variables. The first independent variable 
was Investment; there were two levels of Investment. In the High Invest- 
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ment condition, only 5% of the student's fees for enrolling in the course 
was refundable if the course was dropped; books for the course had been 
purchased from a friend and therefore were not returnable. In the Low 
Investment condition, fees for the course were 100% refundable and all the 
books for the course were on reserve in the library. 
The second independent variable was Choice; there were four levels of 
Choice. In ell conditions, the course could be dropped anytime from Week 6 
through Week 13. In the No Choice condition, the course could not be 
dropped until Week 6. In the One Choice conditions, the subject had one 
opportunity to drop the course before Week 6. There were two variants of 
the One Choice condition -- Early and Late. In the Early condition, prior 
to Week 6 the student was allowed to drop the course in Week 1 only; in the 
Late condition, prior to Week 6 the student was allowed to drop the course 
in Week 5 only. In the All Choices condition, the student was allowed to 
drop the course in any of the first six weeks. The two independent variables 
were fully crossed, yielding eight experimental groups for the exercise. 
procedures. 
Upon arrival in the classroom, each participant was randomly assigned 
to one of the eight experimental groups. When all subjects were seated, a 
briefing sheet containing background information for the role-playing 
exercise was distributed to each subject. The role of each subject was to 
be an undergraduate student starting his or her junior year of college. 
The student was enrolled in four courses; three were required and one was 
an optional course. The subject was informed that he or,she would expect 
with certainty a grade of B in two of the required courses; grades in the 
third required course and the optional course were uncertain. 
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The optional course was the focus of the role-playing exercise. The 
optional course was being taken simply because it was in an area of great 
interest to the student. The student was to receive feedback about his or 
her progress in the course week by week for the first 13 weeks of the 
semester. In the background information, the student was portrayed as 
being of limited means, needing to work to stay in school. The student's 
family had promised a substantial reward (a ten-speed bicycle) if the 
student completed the term with no grade worse than B. The final paragraph 
of the briefing sheet presented the experimental manipulation for the Choice 
and Investment independent variables. 
For each of the hypothetical thirteen "weeks" each subject received a 
single sheet containing feedback about his or her progress in the course 
during the previous week. This feedback was the same for all subjects in 
all conditions, and consisted of class quiz score updates and feedback 
items. Examples of feedback included classroom activities and requirements, 
and events of significance (such as the loss of a notebook containing class 
notes). The feedback items had been pretested on a sample of business 
students from the same population as the subjects for the study. The 
feedback items were sequenced so that the feedback items for the first five 
weeks were relatively innocuous (mean rating of 4.32, on a scale of 1=very 
encouraging and 7=very discouraging) so that no subjects would drop the 
course during that time. From weeks six through thirteen the feedback 
items were discouraging (mean rating of 6.1). The class quiz score updates 
showed the student to be equal to or above the class mean during Weeks 1 
through 5, but well below the mean in Weeks 6 through 13. 
The "weekly" feedback sheets also contained several questions. The 
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principal question was whether the subject wished to continue with the 
course or drop it. This question constituted the primary dependent measure 
for the study and was asked of all subjects in Weeks 6 through 13. (This 
question was also asked of subjects in earlier weeks when required by the 
Choice manipulation.) Additionally, all subjects were asked each week to 
rate their probability of getting a B on the course, and to state their 
main considerations (for dropping or not dropping the course) at that time. 
Subjects who dropped the course were required to continue to complete the 
weekly feedback sheets, except for the decision-to-drop question. This 
prevented subjects from communicating to other subjects by their actions 
their decisions concerning the course. 
Experimental assistants delivered the weekly feedback sheets one at a 
time to subjects. Subjects had four minutes to complete each weekly feed-
back sheet. The sheet for each week was collected before the next week's 
sheet was distributed. To track the decisions, each subject was required 
to put his or her name on each weekly feedback sheet. 
After the feedback sheet for Week 13 had been completed and collected, 
subjects were given a short questionnaire. On this questionnaire, subjects 
rated the extent to which each week's feedback was seen as encouraging or 
discouraging, and answered five additional questions. These questions 
concerned the subject's justification for dropping the course (if appli-
cable), and four checks of the Investment manipulation. 
Following collection of the follow-up questionnaire, subjects were 
debriefed. The entire exercise took one hour and 15 minutes to complete. 
No subjects evidenced suspicion of the true purpose of the exercise. 
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RESULTS 
}Innioulatiort Checks. 
Analysis of the responses to the post-experimental questionnaire 
showed that subjects did recall, unprompted, the key constraints given 
them in the background briefing sheets. The Investment manipulation was 
recalled correctly by 98% of subjects in the High Investment condition, and 
by 95% of subjects in the Low Investment condition. 
Subjects' ratings of the weekly feedback items reflected the pattern of 
ratings obtained during the pretesting of the experimental materials. As 
shown in Table 2, for Weeks 1 through 5, the mean rating of feedback items 
insert Table 2 about here 
across all subjects was relatively neutral (X=4.41, where 1=very encoura-
ging, 7=very discouraging, and 4=neither encouraging nor discouraging); the 
mean rating of feedback items for Weeks 6 through 10 was discouraging 
(X=5.74). The feedback items for Weeks 11 through 13 were also rated as 
neutral (X=3.89). The Investment and Choice manipulations had no significant 
effect on subjects' ratings of the weekly feedback. (It should be remem-
bered that weekly feedback included both the feedback items and weekly 
quiz scores shown in Table 2.) 
Dependent Measures. 
The primary dependent measure for each subject was the weekly decision 
to stay in or drop the course for Weeks 6 through 13. Once having dropped, 
the subject remained in the "having dropped" status for the remainder of 
the experiment. The data are therefore binary in form and have a serial 
correlation from one decision point ("week") to the next. The dependent 
Table 2 
Weekly Quiz 







3.00 1.10 ••■• ■••• OM 1M. 
4.79 0.89 72 68 
4.71 0.83 68 65 
4.84 0.98 62 62 
4.83 1.22 55 56 
5.54 1.41 53 58 
5.95 0.86 57 63 
5.45 1.01 55 63 
5.71 1.24 57 
6.06 0.83 56 62 
4.79 0.91 53 63 
3.56 1.21 57 65 
3.32 1.70 55 65 
	
1 	The course has 3 exams each worth 25% 
of your grade with the remaining 25% 
your overall average on weekly quizzes. 
2 	You don't know anyone in your class. 
3 	You have found out that students who 
took this course last term say it is 
tough. 
4 	Your instructor's office hours are at 
times when you have other classes. 
5 	Your first exam result was 55/100, C+. 
6 	You have lost one of your text books 
for this class with some of your notes 
in it. 
7 	Your instructor is boring. 
8 	Your partner for the term project is a 
9 	There is a field trip planned in place 
of one of the exams and it is scheduled 
for a weekend when you had planned a 
skiing weekend. As you are the organizer 
you will have to rearrange the skiing or 
miss it. 
10 	Your second exam result was 56/100, C - . 
11 	Since the course started one third of 
the class have dropped. 
12 	The instructor wants you and another 
student to recruit and organize drivers 
to take the class on a field site trip. 
13 	Final add/drop week without it appearing 
on your record. 
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variable for each subject was the time ("weeks") until dropping the course. 
For these reasons, the data were subjected to a survival (or "time-to-
event") analysis. Survival analysis entails a comparison of successive 
differences among experimental conditions across time, but provides only 
paired comparisons of experimental conditions for significance testing. 
2 
The basic procedure is analogous to using X to test for statistical inde-
pendence of two variables. For each of the eight experimental conditions 
a survival curve was calculated using the Product Limit method (Kaplan & 
Meier, 1958). These survival curves, shown in Figure 1, display the 
proportion of subjects remaining in the course by the length of time (in 
weeks) they remained in the course after Week 6. (Week 6 is used as the 
zero point since it is the first Week in which subjects in all conditions 
have the opportunity to drop the course.) Thus, the proportion remaining 
seven weeks after Week 6 represents those subjectss who never dropped out. 
The curves were compared to each other using both the logrank (Peto &L AO, 
1977) and the Generalized Wilcoxon (Gehan, 1965) statistics. Both of these 
methods are nonparametric tests suitable for censored time-to-failure data, 
but use different weighting schemes in asessing the significance of 
experimentl effects. Both test statistics must be significant in order to 
infer a significant experimental effect in the strictness sense. 
insert Figure 1 about here 
The results of the survival analysis are shown in Table 3. Hypothesis 
1(b) was confirmed; Choice influenced commitment (as measured by the 
subject's not dropping the course) only when. Investment was High. In the 
FIGURE 1 A 
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Low Investment condition, paired comparisons among conditions revealed no 
significant effects for Choice (all kt s>.37). A different picture 
emerged in the High Investment condition; subjects persisted in the course 
significantly longer in the All Choices and Once Choice Early conditions 
•than in the No Choices condition (p<.05). Following from the confirma-
tion of Hypothesis 1(b), subsequent analyses dealt with the effects of 
Choice only in the High Investment condition. 
insert Table 3 about here 
• 
Hypothesis 2 addressed the relationship between the number of choices 
made (before feedback became discouraging) and the amount of commitment 
evidenced. Persistence was not significantly greater in the All Choices 
condition than in either of the One Choice conditions (a's›.36). These 
results, together with inspection of the survival curves, suggest that the 
relationship between Choice and commitment is curvilinear rather than linear; 
Hypothesis 2(b) is supported. 
Hypothesis 3 addressed the effects of a time lag between Choice and 
the onset of discouraging feedback. The survival curves for One Choice 
Early and One Choice Late did not differ significantly (P.36). However, 
the One Choice Early condition did exhibit significantly greater persis-
tence than the No Choice condition (•12.05), while the One Choice Late 
condition did not (p>.20). These results then provide only limited support 
for Hypothesis 3(a), that the longer the time lag between Choice and the 
onset of discouraging feedback the more commitment will be evidenced. 
The fourth hypothesis related to the length of time that commitment 
sustains persistence. 	Hypothesis 4(b) was supported; inspection of the 
Table 3 
TIME TO DROP 
Conditions Paired Comparisons Log Rank Wilcoxon 
Low Investment 
1=No Choice 1 v 2 .578 .618 
2=One Choice Early 1 v 3 .725 .999 
3=One Choice Late 1 v 4 .370 .399 
4=All Choices 2 v 3 .889 .646 
2 v 4 .772 .908 
3 v 4 .599 .385 
High Investment 
1=No Choice 1 v 2 * .021 .044 
2=One Choice Early 1 v 3 .236 .240 
3=One Choice Late 1 v 4 * .044 .044 
4=All Choices 2 v 3 .366 .368 
2 v 4 .601 .354 
3 v 4 ' 	.129 .057 
* indicates a<.05 for both logrank and Wilcoxon statistics 
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eight survival curves leaves no doubt that commitment does not endure 
unchanged in the face of repeated discouraging feedback. By the end of 
Week 13, fully 77% of all subjects had terminated their enrollment in 
the course. There were no significant differences by experimental 
condition in proportion of subjects remaining in the course after Week 13 
(0.30). 
Subjects' ratings of the probability of getting a B in the course are 
shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b). There were no significant differences in 
estimated probabilities of success by experimental condition (a>.30). 
insert Figure 2 about here 
DISCUSSION 
The results of the study described here provide some valuable 
additional insights into the relationship between choosing to engage in a 
course of action and feeling emotionally bound to pursue that course of 
action in the face of negative feedback. 
One central finding of the study is that choice only affects commit-
ment to a course of action (in the sense of being willing to persist in 
that course of action) when the choice has consequences. There is an 
important message here for the purveyors of participative decision-making: 
there are choices and then there are choices. An individual asked to take 
part in making a decision when it is clear that his or her voice has no 
effect on the outcomes may not feel committed to the decision. "Coopting" 
an individual therefore is not just a matter of getting him or her involved 
in the decision-making process; the involvement must be consequential from 
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that choice only fosters commitment when the choice entails responsibility 
for consequences. 
On the other hand, the data from the present study also suggest that 
Any involvement in a decision (if consequential) is involvement, as 
long as the involvement entails exercising choice once. Apparently the 
feeling of being responsible via choice need not be reinforced by repetition 
to influence behavior. One choice seems to generate the psychological 
binding almost as well as many choices. At a practical level, decision-
makers should be warned that participation in only one consequential 
decision apparently induces stronger feelings of commitment than might be 
imagined, almost as strong perhaps as the feelings of someone who has 
"lived" with a decision for a while. In line with popular beliefs about 
prevention of "groupthink" (e.g., Janus, 1972), this conclusion warns 
against making "preliminary" judgments (and in favor of preliminary non-
evaluative consideration of alternatives) before all the data are in on 
a question, lest a decision-makers feel trapped by any preliminary (albeit 
"non-binding") judgment. 
The results of this study also clarify what it means (at a behavioral 
level) to say that someone is "committed" to a course of action. Often, 
commitment is used with the apparent denotation of irrational attachment to 
a course of action. The results of the study described in this paper belie 
this view of commitment; the persistence fostered by choosing to engage in 
a course of action decays in the face of negative feedback, indicating both 
a rational awareness and processing of the negative information. (Most 
subjects in this study "committed" to staying in the course by virtue of 
having chosen to do so eventually quit.) Thus, to the extent that commit- 
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ment entails some measure of irrational persistence or escalation,.that 
irrationality is bounded; eventually the weight of the negative evidence 
takes its toll. It remains then as something of a puzzle that at the end 
of the study described here, some subjects persisted even in the face of 
seemingly overwhelming justification to quit. For these subjects, the_ 
irrational characterization of commitment may accurately describe their 
reaction to negative feedback, once having embarked on a course of Action. 
It remains for future research to understand individual differences in this 
arena of investigation. 
Finally, it is worth noting the implications of the "probability of 
success" data collected in this study. That there were no differences by 
experimental condition in perception of success probability, but neverthe-
less significant differences in persistence, suggests that choice need not 
result in some kind of motivated misperception to fester commitment. One 
popular interpretation of the "choice fosters commitment" notion is that 
being invested in a course of action via choice will influence perceptions 
of the world in a way that justifies the original choice, and persistence 
in that choice. In the present study, however, perceptions of success were 
the same even for groups of subjects whose reactions to those perceptions 
were quite discrepant. This suggests that motivated misperception, while 
perhaps sufficient for producing persistence to a previously chosen course 
of action, may not be a necessary condition. Thus, commitment may have less 
to do with how people see the world than with how those people choose to 
react to the world they see. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1. Proportion of subjects remaining in the course by time to 
dropout for (a) Low Investment and (b) High Investment conditions. 
Figure 2. Subjects' estimated probability of success (getting a "B") 
by weeks for (a) Low Investment and (b) High Investment subjects. 
